Democratic Political Development: A Methodological Inquiry Focusing on Southern States by Burden, Sandra Kaye
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1970 
Democratic Political Development: A Methodological Inquiry 
Focusing on Southern States 
Sandra Kaye Burden 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Burden, Sandra Kaye, "Democratic Political Development: A Methodological Inquiry Focusing on Southern 
States" (1970). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539624694. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-cenz-m803 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A METHODOLOGICAL
INQUIRY FOCUSING ON SOUTHERN STATES
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of Government 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 





ProQ uest Number: 10625126
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction  is d e p e n d e n t  upon th e  quality of th e  co p y  subm itted.
In th e  unlikely ev e n t th a t th e  au thor did not send  a  c o m p le te  m anuscript 
an d  th e re  a re  missing p ag es , th e se  will b e  n o ted . Also, if m aterial h ad  to  b e  rem oved ,
a  n o te  will ind icate  th e  deletion.
Published by ProQ uest LLC (2017). Copyright of th e  Dissertation is held by th e  Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is p ro te c te d  against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United S tates C o d e
Microform Edition © ProQ uest LLC.
ProQ uest 10625126
ProQ uest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346
APPROVAL SHEET 
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment 









Political scientists are rightly occupied with 
problems of change and "modernization" in a world 
that is in desperate need of both. But why study 
these phenomena in other cultures and ignore the 
revolutionary changes that are occurring in America's 
own "underdeveloped area"? For some reason most 
political scientists seem willing to leave descrip­
tion and analysis of the South's political revo­
lution to today's journalists and tomorrow's 
historians.
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to inquire into the diversity 
and complexity of political development processes. The conditions 
and consequences of democratic governance in eleven southern states 
are investigated in terms of a methodology which not only permits 
replication and validity checks but attempts to come to grips with 
the formidable problem of causality. Theory building techniques for 
transposing normative conceptual schemes into empirical models 
are stressed.
The American South is presented as an authentic "developing area" 
and, as such, a propiquitous source of high quality quantitative in­
formation needed to build empirical theories and models of democratic 
political development. The attempt to fit comparable data drawn from 
eleven southern states over three distinct time periods to a Communications 
Model of democratic political development which fitted data drawn from' 
seventy-seven nations indicated that the process of democratic political 
development in the South differs, and differs significantly, from that 
postulated by the Communications Model.
The findings of this study suggest that regional or cluster 
comparisons which agressively and imaginatively investigate the 
relationships linking man, his environment, and his government in 
distinct contexts, or in terms of precise typologies, are needed to 
enrich and render more didactic the growing body of literature focusing 
on democratic political development.
vii
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A METHODOLOGICAL
INQUIRY FOCUSING ON SOUTHERN STATES
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The ecology of modernization is a subject researched and studied 
by social scientists with increasing frequency and rigor. Salient 
disparities in levels of social, economic, and political development 
among contemporary societies dramatize the divergent nature and pace 
of modernization processes. Because the goals as well as the process 
of modernization differ from society to society, the social, economic, 
and political correlates of modernization are investigated from 
various perspectives.
Intellectual curiosity and an idealistic sense of pragmatism 
shape the double-edged rationale of social scientists studying modern­
ization. In the interests of science, scholars delve to accumulate 
knowledge and generate systematic explanations of the complex factors 
involved in modernization. In the interests of humanity, scholars and 
laymen work to build knowledge of modernization which is relevant and 
practicable and, hence, can be applied to improve living conditions 
in the real world.
Knowledge in this context means empirical, not normative, state­
ments which are scientifically derived and inter-linked.^ "What is
*"Cf. Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth 
Century Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1959). 
See pp. 114-16 for Brecht's treatment of "intersubjectively transmissible 
knowledge" which defines the usage of "knowledge" in this thesis. For further 
clarifications of terminology, including "theory" and "scientific method," 
see pp. 14-17 "and pp. 27-160 passim.
3modernization" and "What is the political function in the modernization 
process" easily become polemical questions which science cannot answer. 
Scientific study, however, can provide answers to questions about the 
relationship between selected characteristics of modernizing societies 
and polities. By stating a priori the desired end state of the moderni­
zation process, researchers can critically and systematically investigate
i
the determinants and consequences of selected modernization goals.
In an age marked by unsurpassed technological and scientific 
achievements, the pervasiveness and tenacity of social and political 
problems appear anachronistic. "Our greatest challenge today," Arnold 
Toynbee asserts, "is the morality gap between our cumulative accelerating 
advance in science and technology and our appalling failure in our rela­
tionships with each other."'*' Social scientists are working to meet this 
challenge. Because political institutions and practices are by definition 
the instruments used to treat social problems, the work of political sci­
entists who build knowledge about political development assumes particular 
s ignif icance.
Political Science and Political Development
Political development is the label frequently ascribed to the 
political dimension of modernization. Although both terms are ill- 
defined, modernization and political development are popularly used 
in reference to complex phenomena in changing societies. While the 
term political development may narrow the scope of modernization some­
what by referring primarily to the development of political institutions
^Arnold Toynbee, as quoted in an interview in Saturday Review,
April 5, 1969, p. 23.
4and practices, the range of inquiry remains vast and often ambiguous. 
Consequently, imprecise definitions of both terms mark conceptualization 
as a most pernicious barrier to theoretical advancement.
Conceptualization poses a two-fold problem. Building knowledge 
of political development requires concepts which are at once theoretically 
significant and operational. To come to grips with the problem of con­
ceptualization one must limit the broad intellectual space covered by 
amorphous terms, such as modernization and political development, without 
eliminating the concept’s theoretical significance. An attempt to over­
come such conceptual difficulties begins here by delimiting democratic 
political development as the subject of the present inquiry.
Democratic Political Development
Democracy, as a classic form of government and as a modern way
of life, has been studied from many viewpoints. Western scholars, in
particular:, have studied the conditions which give rise to and the
consequences which ensue from democratic governance. Moreover, those
who value democracy highly, as does the present writer, see it as the
desired end state of the process of political development. Hence, it
seems appropriate to study democracy as one type of political development.
Learning about the conditions and consequences of democratic
political development calls for careful study of different societies
and their governments. What is involved in the process of democratic
political development
. . .is an especially acute question in those parts of the world 
where democratic institutions are new, their social bases are 
weak, and governments are in the position of seeking social change 
while remaining able to control it. . . . It is through the compa­
rative analysis of democracies in widely differing conditions and 
through time that we can learn something about their potentialities
5and ultimate compatibilities with drastic social change.
Empirical research drawn from many such societies ,r. . . should help 
to produce a genuine theory of democratic government— a theory having 
practical as well as ethical importance for our times.
While various dimensions of democratic political development, 
such as integration, legitimacy, participation, competition, equalitari- 
anism, and bureaucratization, have been recognized, the formidable task 
of devising adequate, operational definitions remains. To permit research­
ing the relationships between democratic political development and se­
lected modernization factors in the southern United States, the definition 
employed here is limited first to democracy and then to selected demo­
cratic characteristics.
Democratic political development may be defined as a dynamic 
process of diffusion between the society and polity characterized by 
rising levels of political participation and competition for authorita­
tive decision-making positions. As defined by this researcher, the 
above concept is operationalized to investigate the conditions and 
consequences of democratic political development in eleven southern 
states.
A Study of Democratic Political 
Development in the South
Conceptualization, observation, and comparison are the hallmark 
of efforts to build scientific theories of political development. Con­
ceptualization, involving a delimitation of scope and the careful defi-
■^David Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Moderniza­
tion (Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentic Hall, 1969), pp. 46-7.
^Ibid., p. 47.
6nition of terms, is a first step in learning about political develop­
ment. Concepts such as that offered above can then be investigated 
empirically, that is, ascribed quantitative meaning and observed in 
terms of discrete analytic units. Findings obtained in this manner 
can be compared and contrasted to discern patterns of similarity and 
dissimilarity. The employment of these procedures is one of the objec­
tives in the following study of democratic political development in 
the South.
The purpose of this study is to attempt a modest step in the 
direction of understanding democratic political development. Employing 
eleven southern states as the units of comparative analysis, this 
endeavor begins with an effort to integrate ideas from several realms 
of political inquiry into a disciplined framework of study which can 
be applied to various groupings of analytic units. The initial focus 
on the theoretical and methodological aspects of studies in political 
development is subsequently concentrated on fitting a theoretical model 
of democratic political development to empirical data drawn from the 
once-Confederate southern states. The method used to test the fit between 
empirical theory and quantitative data has been previously applied by 
Donald McCrone and Charles Cnudde.
Using model construction and related theory building techniques, 
McCrone and Cnudde have reported a satisfactory fit between a "communi­
cations theory of democratic political development" and correlational 
data for seventy-seven nations. Furthermore, they have accepted a series 
of empirical propositions— which causally link urbanization, education, 
and communications with democratic political development— as the "beginnings 
of a parsimonious theory of democratic political development."^
^Donald McCrone and Charled Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory 
of Democratic Political Development," Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., 1967: 72-79.
7Any development theory Is essentially a series of int^r-linked, 
causal statements. Therefore, procedures for handling causality in 
developmental research are clearly needed. McCrone and Cnudde*s pro­
cedures for transposing research findings into theoretical propositions 
represent a unique attempt to distinguish causal relationships from 
correlation data. Because even under the most ideal experimental con­
ditions the treatment of causality poses troublesome problems, McCrone 
and Cnudde*s method deserves close and critical study.
A Preview of the Text
The theoretical and methodological groundwork for the investi­
gation of democratic political development in the South is laid in 
the following chapter. The utility of comparative analysis in studying 
the development process and theory building techniques in transposing 
research findings into theoretical schemes is discussed in the first 
part of Chapter II.
A variety of conceptual approaches to political development is 
considered in the second part of Chapter II. This discussion is aimed 
at developing a concept of political development which is at once rele­
vant, in terms of theoretical significance, and rigorous, in terms of 
operational reliability and validity. A pluralist, multi-dimensional 
concept of political development is presented and is the basis from 
which an operational definition of democratic political development 
is drawn.
A nascent theory of democratic political development is re­
constructed in Chapter III. This "communications theory" of demo­
cratic political development, as formularized by McCrone and Cnudde,
8rests heavily on the works of S.M. Lipset, Daniel Lerner, and Phillips 
Outright..^* Inasmuch as the McCrone-Cnudde model is based on cross­
national data, some of the problems of generalizing from cross-national, 
correlational studies in efforts to build theory are pointed out at the 
end of this chapter.
In Chapter IV the McCrone-Cnudde model is discussed in more 
detail, with particular attention focused on model construction as 
a potent theory building technique. The methodology and formulations 
of McCrone and Cnudde are critically reviewed, and the rationale for 
adopting their procedures for formulating causal propositions about the 
developmental process in the South is given. Simplification of the 
complex phenomena dynamically entangled in the development process is 
deemed the primary advantage of model construction.
The two chapters which follow focus on the South. The first,
/Chapter V, marks the South as an authentic developing area and, con­
sequently, a propiquitous source of the quantitative data needed for 
empirical research. Several, perhaps peculiar, problems of democratic 
political development in the South are outlined and considered from 
both academic and practical points of view. There also the case is 
presented for employing distinct environmental settings, such as the 
South, as analytic units in comparative studies of political development.
This argument rests on the belief that empirical theories of political 
development based on cross-national data, such as the "communications
■^Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy:
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," Amer. Pol. Sci.Rev.,
1959: 69-105; Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society 
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958); and Phillips Outright, "National 
Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," Amer. Soc. Rev.,
1963: 253-64.
theory" mentioned above, suggest a generic process of political devel­
opment which is at once misleading and dubious. Constructing typologies 
of political development with empirical referrents and phrased in terms 
of deviation from a general model is presented as a realistic and didactic 
goal which is facillitated by comparing environmental and political data 
drawn from discrete analytic clusters.
The major thrust of this thesis comes in Chapter VI. There 
environmental and political correlational data, similar to that used 
by McCrone and Cnudde but drawn from eleven southern states over a 
twenty year time period, is presented and analyzed. Causal inference 
and theory building techniques are used to test the validity of the 
"communications model of democratic political development" in the South.
In efforts to add a longitudinal dimension, correlation data for the 
key variables— urbanization, education, communications, and democratic 
political devedopment— are given for three separate time periods. The 
"communications model" is then tested to determine the fit of the south­
ern data to the model for each time segment. Rather than accentuating 
the stages of development prescribed by the "communications theory," as 
anticipated, the findings of the investigations in this chapter suggest 
an "education model" of democratic political development for the South. 
Nonetheless, and this point should be underlined, the fit between the 
southern data and the several alternative models proposed by McCrone 
and Cnudde is not consistently satisfactory.
This realization leads to the conclusion that correlation data 
must meet at least certain statistical requirements before it can be 
fruitfully fitted to a model. Recounting the obvious fact that iden-
tification of associations among variables, i.e. the detection of 
plausible causes of a dependent variable through linear regression 
analysis, preceeds formulations about causality, this researcher 
concludes that an attempt to construct a model of democratic political 
development for the South based on the data used in this study would, 
at best, be premature. In plain language, McCrone and Cnudde1s sophis­
ticated procedures for distinguishing causal relationships would appear 
to demand high quality data and considerably large zero-order and multipl 
correlation coefficients.
Closing the book on attempts to build a model of southern 
democratic political development, Chapter VII exploringly re-considers 
the preliminary task of identifying the crucial factors associated with 
democratic political development in the South. Wealth and racial bal­
ance are found to be highly correlated with the political development 
index. An alternative operationalization of democratic political devel­
opment (which attempts to incorporate the "political institutionalization 
dimension suggested by Samuel Huntington)^is introduced, and its rela­
tionships with the environmental and political variables investigated 
previously are discussed.
The primary purpose of Chapter VII is to explore the possible 
consequences of democratic political development in the South through 
consideration of its relationship with welfare policy. Resting heavily 
on the pioneering works of Thomas Dye, an operational definition of 
State Welfare Effort is given to permit comparisons among the southern
-^Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," 
World Politics, 1965: 386-430.
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states with regard to levels of welfare effort and levels of political 
and social development.^ While the findings of this exploratative research 
generally support those of similar studies comparing all the American 
states, i.e. welfare policy is more sensitive to environmental than 
political factors, the potential for predicting southern welfare effort 
from a combination of ecological and political data is found to be 
particularly high ( R = .95 ).
Chapter VIII is devoted to summation and concluding remarks.
Regarding the construction of democratic political development models, 
some criticisms of the McCrone-Cnudde study are set forth, and several 
implications for further research are spelled out. More importantly, 
the appropriateness of the South as a focus for scholars interested in 
political development is reiterated.
Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes
in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966) and Politics in 
States and Communities (Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969).
CHAPTER II
POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
PART A: RESEARCH AND THEORY
Empirical statements and a logical basis from which to generalize 
are the cornerstones of Brechtian political theory. As discussed in this 
chapter, theorizing about political development necessitates both quanti­
tative and comparative research. In studying political development com­
paratively, political scientists ". . . test the universalism of ideas 
in more and more particular contexts, using micro as well as macro units 
;and quantitative data."^ Because comparative analysis yields generaliza­
tions about political life in developing societies, efforts to build 
theories of political development frequently employ comparative analytical 
frameworks.
An Overview of Comparative Politics
Students of comparative politics have assumed many faces over the
past several decades. After years of concentration on foreign political
institutions, the field of comparative politics "commenced to undergo
2
radical transformation in the early 1950,s.M Factors both internal and 
external to Political Science have ushered in an apparent revolution in
^Apter, Conceptual Approaches to Modernization, p. 4.
^Scarrow, Howard A., Comparative Political Analysis: An Intro­
duction (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 1.
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studying contemporary governments.
Within the discipline, the behavioral persuasion has gained in­
fluence and affected the perspective of those comparatively studying 
political phenomena. Concomitantly, growing numbers of newly indepen­
dent states after World War II have dramatized the fact that "people 
can be organized in hundreds of ways unassociated with the modern state." 
A redirection of interests and energies among students of comparative 
politics, so as to discern and illuminate the common dimensions of poli­
tical life, has rejuvenated the entire discipline. A 1962 survey indi­
cates that American political scientists view comparative politics as
2the field in which the most significant work is being done.
Howard Scarrow has described the transformations of this sub­
field as (1) an expansion of geographical horizons; (2) a broadening
intellectual focus; and, (3) a concentrated effort to render political
3study genuinely comparative. To these characteristics, a fourth can 
be added: an effort to identify, conceptualize, and inter-relate the
major factors of social change and political development. "One of the 
most vital needs for further theoretical progress," Robert Ward corrob­
orates, "is a deeper understanding of political change or development 
phrased in comparative terms.
^Roland Young, quoted by James Charlesworth (ed.), A Design for 
Political Science (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and
Social Sciences, 1966), p. 193.
Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, "Trends in American Political 
Science," Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., 1963: 933-47.
^Scarrow, Comparative Political Analysis, pp. 1-4.
^Robert Ward (ed.), Studying Politics Abroad (Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 1964), p. 77.
The Focus on Development
Change, the volatility of societies, remains little understood.
The political, economic, and sociological dimensions of change have been 
noted and variously labeled evolution or revolution, progress, and, more 
currently, modernization. Still, as John McKinney suggests, "Change as 
variously conceptualized in cycles, spirals, straight lines, ascendencies, 
discontinuous alterations, and dialectic zigzags leaves us with a sense 
of inadequacy and a low predictive ability. . . .
The problem of social change is closely akin to and further com­
plicated by that of continuity. Historians in particular have often 
seen the stabilizing elements which characterize continuity as but 
another side of change. So it is both sides, both change and continuity, 
which constitute the coin of development so highly valued on the world 
market today.
In efforts to comprehend more fully the dynamics of continuity 
and change, social scientists seek to discern and explain the common 
dimensions of development. Despite a lack of agreement on the precise 
nature of the various dimensions, it is generally assumed that environ­
mental, behavioral, and institutional factors are intimately involved 
in the process of development.
Because development continually affects so many aspects of social 
life, "it has become a major preoccupation of social science in all of
O
its branches."
^-John McKinney and Edgar Thompson (eds.), The South in Continuity 
and Change (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965), pp. 15-16.
^John Crittenden, "Dimensions of Modernization in the American 
States," Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., 1967: 989.
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The problem of the relationship between social order and change is 
persistent, and it is not only a problem of vast practical significance 
to any social system, but constitutes the highest level theoretical 
and empirical problem of the academic disciplines concerned with 
social life.^
The myriad problems of development raise tantalizing questions in the minds
of scholars and laymen alike. These questions evolve around goals and
process: they are questions of What and how.
An answer to the first question involves the setting of specific
objectives toward which a society should move. What kind of economic
system? What kind of political regime? What kind of social structures?
These are basic questions confronting policy-makers in developing areas.
Yet, the goals selected— the prescribed policy objectives— must be
practicable. If any sort of development is to be achieved, policies
must be known which, when properly implemented, will bring the social
system closer to its chosen objectives.
While the question of what (prescribing development goals) may not
be within the realm of political science scholarship, the question of
how clearly belongs in that domain. For ". . . coping with the problems
of continuity and change is dependent upon the ability to mobilize
2
relevant knowledge." Coming to grips with the process of development 
necessitates the mobilization of relevant knowledge with which to 
anticipate and perhaps re-channel and mold the indigenous forces of 
change and continuity.
The political function in the development process— "to maintain
^McKinney, The South in Continuity and Change, p. 3.
^Ibid., p. 28.
' T e ­
stable controls over these rapid changes"— is everywhere acknowledged,
but nowhere understood. The role of political scientists, who attempt
to delineate alternative responses and weigh the consequences of each
policy choice, assumes particular significance.
Implications for Research and Theory
The relationship between goals and process is similar to that
between ends and means. An understanding of this relationship has
important consequences for both research and theory.
The question of the appropriateness of the means for achieving a 
given end is undoubtedly accessible to scientific analysis. Inasmuch 
as we are able to determine which means for the achievement of a 
proposed end are appropriate and inappropriate, we can in this way 
estimate the chances of attaining a certain end by certain available 
means. In this way we can indirectly criticize the setting of the 
end itself. . . .2
The implications for empirical research and scientific theory should be
clear: (1) The understanding of political development demands a method
which enhances the accumulation of knowledge. This is the Scientific
Method. (2) Only by specifying a priori the goals or ends can the
appropriate means for achieving those ends be scientifically studied.
(3) The setting of goals, in WeberTs words, is "not a task which science
can undertake."
Theory, the explanation of circumscribed phenomena, requires 
both specific knowledge and a logical basis from which to generalize.
Any restless area presents social research with an excellent oppor-
^Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communications Theory of Modernization," 
in Lucian Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 331.
^Max Weber, "’'Objectivity* of Knowledge in Social Science and Social 
Policy" (1904), quoted in Brecht, Political Theory, pp. 223-24.
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tunity to meet the need for a theoretically sound, empirically based 
exposition of the process called modernization. To be sure there are 
particularities in each situation. Particularities can be wedded to 
generalizations, however, if we focus social research in any area 
upon those aspects of the process which it shares with other regions 
of the world that are seeking to accompany rapid economic growth 
with social change.1
Daniel Lernerfs remarks above, regarding a communications theory of
modernization, highlight the importance of genuinely comparative study.
Empirical research in comparative politics seeks 11. . .to discover 
regularities and variations of political organizations by comparative 
analysis of historical and contemporary systems.’ Particularities and 
generalities about political development, as indicated by research findings, 
are needed for systematic explanation and theoretical advancement.
"Orderly comparison is one necessary step in the process of systematic
O
explanation.1,0
Building Theories of Political Development
Comparative researches are providing a growing body of infor­
mation about the relationships between political and environmental 
variables in diverse socio-economic contexts. Yet, scientific theories 
explaining aspects of political development have been few. Among all 
social scientists, political scientists have been most prone to view 
scientific theorizing with reserve and often with reluctance or mis­
understanding. Confusion about the nature and function of political
^•Lerner, "Communications Theory of Modernization," p. 331.
C. Smith in David Easton (ed.), Varieties of Political Theory 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 113.
^Edward Shils, "The Comparative Study of New States," in Clifford 
Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press,
1963), p. 15.
theory has apparently tainted persisting apprehensions.
Political theory, in the lexicon of the empiricist, does not 
imply "iron laws of politics." It does mean systematic explanations 
of political life. Theories are analytical, intellectual constructions 
— "ways of delimiting reality for various purposes and for ultimately 
acting upon it."'*'
Because the integrity of a theory is often adjudged by its appli­
cability, that is the number of real-life cases which fit and thus can
be explained in terms of the theory, an emphasis on broad all-encompassing
2theories of social action and political and economic life continues.
A contrary tendency has been to focus on particular aspects of the poli­
tical or social system. Relatively narrow studies have more recently 
provided quantitative information about limited aspects of political 
life. Yet, whether the focus has been broad or narrow, the relation­
ship between political system characteristics and the nature and scope 
of the modernization process remains unclear; in part, at least, because 
of the failure to gather data under the constraint of a clearly conceived 
theory and, in part, because of the failure to develop and revise theories 
under the discipline of empirical investigation.
Scientific theories of development, creatively conceived and 
rigorously investigated, are prerequisite to understanding, explaining, 
and anticipating the forces of development. If the effort is to accumu-
^Apter, Conceptual Approaches to Modernization, p . 5.
^Talcott Parsons has perhaps been the leader of the school of 
sweeping theories which attempt to conceptualize the essence or core of 
social systems. Cf. also David Apter, The Politics of Modernization 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); C. E. Black, The Dynamics of
Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); E. E. .Hagen, On the Theory
of Social Change (Homewood, 111,: Dorsey Press, 1962); William Kornhauser,
The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959).
late and assemble knowledge which is relevant and applicable, energies 
must be directed at building theories which have immediate empirical 
relevance— not esoteric theoretical schemes. The quality of such theories 
depends on the quality of research designs and the continuing replication 
of similar researches employing varied analytic units.
Quantitative and qualitative research findings are providing a 
broad and solid foundation upon which scientific theories of political 
development can be constructed. Yet, transposing the findings of empi­
rical research into theoretical formulations remains a major task in 
building theories of political development.
Closing the Gap Between Research and Theory
Recent social science research can truly be seen as the harbinger 
of sought-after theories of social change and political development.
Yet, the volume and intensity of unrefined research in political sci­
ence has had the inadvertent effect of making the inherent gap between 
research and theory more visible and tantalizing. The gap between the 
languages of research and theory, Hubert Blalock points out, "can never 
be bridged in a completely satisfactory way."
One thinks in terms of a theoretical language that contains notions 
such as causes, forces, systems, and properties. But one’s tests 
are made in terms of covariations, operations, and pointer readings. 
Although a concept such as mass may be conceived theoretically or 
metaphysically as a property, it is only a pious opinion, in Eddington’ 
words, that 'mass' as a property is equivalent to ’mass1 as inferred 
from pointer readings.
Recognition of the differences between the languages of research and
theory is fundamental to realizing that some methods of theory building
^Hubert Blalock, Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research 
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 5.
may be preferable to others.
In theorizing about political development, one inevitably makes 
judgements or causal inferrences about the sequence of variable relation­
ships. Yet, so long as the basis for making these judgements, that is 
the criteria and procedures applied in analyzing research data, differ 
among researchers or remain elusive and ambiguous, isolated research 
findings can never be consolidated into a didactic theoretical network. 
Clearly, the task of assembling cumulative knowledge about political 
development demands consistent applications of sound analytic methods 
to related researches.
While a scientific frame of reference-*- is undoubtedly a formidable, 
indeed indispensable, weapon of aspiring theorists, there exists a variety 
of essentially scientific methods to chose from; some, perhaps, being 
more appropriate than others for the particular task at hand. For the 
political scientist interested in political development, the chosen 
analytic methods must not only permit disciplined replication of related 
researches but must also define appropriate procedures for making theoret­
ical judgements about causality. One such method of transposing research 
data into theoretical formulations of the process of political develop-
^Rarl Pearson, The Grammar of Science, Second Edition, Part I (1911) 
provides this classic definition: "The classification of facts, the
recognition of their sequence and relative significance is the function 
of science, and the habit of forming a judgement upon those facts unbiased 
by personal feeling is the characteristic of what may be termed the 
scientific frame of mind. The scientific method of examining facts is 
not peculiar to one class of phenomena and to one class of workers; it 
is applicable to social as well as physical problems. . . ." In a more 
pithy fasion, Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1962), p. 218, marks scientific methodology as "a way 
of preventing me from deceiving myself in regard to my creatively formed 
subjective hunches. . . ."
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ment involves the construction and testing of causal models.
In the process of theory building one begins with simple causal 
models, tests to see if they fit the data, modifies them until he 
is willing to commit himself (temporarily) to a given model, and 
then finally attempts to estimate standardized and unstandardized 
regression coefficients. At the same time he is aware that other 
models may also fit the data and that his measures of relative im­
portance are appropriate to only a given model and a particular set 
of data. The interplay between theory and research takes on real 
meaning in the process.1
In this process of inferring causal relationships, the science of sta­
tistics provides needed analytic discipline. Thinking in terms of causal 
models, mathematical principles, rather than intuitive whims or fancies, 
are applied in altering or rejecting the model being tested.
While statistics provides no formula for proving that variable X. 
causes variable _Y, statistics does provide a number of applied mathematical 
principles and techniques for determining if, how, and to what extent X 
and Y_ are related. The Pearson correlation coefficient, for example, 
statistically defined as ranging from -1.0 to +1.0, is popularly employed 
by social scientists as a measure of the association between variables. 
Nonetheless, this relatively sophisticated statistic (which is framed by 
a set of assumptions such as linearity, random error distribution, and 
homoscedasticity that may or may not be appropriate for different data sets) 
measures only association— never causation.
Model construction techniques, based on similar statistical princi­
ples, are aimed at extending the findings of correlation analysis by dis­
tinguishing between spurious, indirect and direct relationships and thereby 
limiting the range of possible or probable causal linkages. In much the
^Hubert Blalock, Jr. and Ann Blalock (eds.), Methodology in Social 
Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), p. 196.
22
same way as correlation analysis defines statistically significant associ­
ations and thus permits the researcher to objectively assess the relation­
ship between variables, model construction techniques allow him to make 
unbiased causal inferences regarding the sequence and interactions of a 
set of variables through the comparison of actual and predicted measures 
of possible associations. In simple terms, the actual measures which derive 
directly from the data are compared with the predicted measures which obtain 
from the researcher’s assumptions about the data. If, for example, one 
assumption is that characteristics X, Y and JZ are isolated from external 
disturbing influences and another is thatY_ is the dependent variable, 
the prediction that T  and X are spuriously or indirectly related ( z = 0
or r = r r_ ) can be tested against the actual partials indicated by xy xz
the data*^ Following these procedures for making judgements concerning 
the adequacy of alternative causal models, the researcher "can proceed 
by eliminating inadequate models that make predictions that are not consistent 
with the data."^
Models which include only a few variables and thus limit the number 
of possible inter-relationships are easier to handle but offer less pay-off 
than more complex ones. This state of affairs creates a dilemma for the 
social scientist who needs to ". . . select models that are at the same time 
simple enough to permit him to think with the aid of a model but, also, 
sufficiently realistic that the simplifications required do not lead to 
predictions that are highly inaccurate." On the other hand, Blalock
•^ For a thorough discussion of partial correlation and causal 
interpretations see Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill,
I960), pp. 332-43.
^Blalock, Causal Inferences, p. 62.
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continues, "The more complex the model, the more difficult it becomes 
to decide exactly which modifications to make and which new variables 
to introduce. Put simply, the basic dilemma faced by all sciences is 
that of how much to oversimplify reality.
It seems necessary to emphasize that model construction and testing, 
employing the techniques sketched above, is only one, but a highly valid, 
way of coming to grips with causality and methodically assessing the 
nature of variable relationships. It should be further noted that such 
procedures of causal inferrence can never ". . . establish any given 
model as the single correct one."^ Because a number of models could 
conceivably fit any given set of data, the initial selection of models 
to be tested is a crucial aspect of theory building procedures. Guided 
by the perceptions and intuitions which frame his nascent theory, the 
researcher initially limits the number of alternative models by choosing 
only "a finite number of specified variables." In so doing, he admits 
"that had another set been selected, his model might have looked quite 
different."^
Conclusions about the process of development derived in this manner 
are refined empirical propositions. When utilized with precision and 
caution, model building techniques can be a powerful tool for analyzing 
political development. Thoughtfully and exactingly employed, this method 
offers the prospect of a ". . . parsimonious theory, rather than mere cor­
relates of, the process of democratic political development. . . .
^-Blalock, Causal Inferences, p. 8.
2Ibid., p. 20.
3Ibid., p. 15.
^McCrone and Cnudde, "Causal Model of Democratic Political 
Development," p. 78.
CHAPTER II
POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
PART B: THEORY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION
A first step in both research and theory is conceptualization, 
this is the definition of terms to be studied. Identifying and con­
ceptualizing the major factors of the development process has been a 
great barrier to building theories of political development. The idea 
of political development itself has most generally been used as a catch­
word rather than as an operational concept; and has thus confounded the 
already complex task of theory building.
At this point, agreement about a concept of political development
appears limited to the meager assumption that political development is a
"good thing," whatever that may mean. Lucian Pye has aptly identified
the basis of the conceptual difficulty:
The difficulty with concepts of political modernization and devel­
opment is that there are so many. . . . A political system is ex­
pected to do more than merely solve problems; it must cope with in- 
soluable issues, and it must provide people with a sense of identity 
and of fundamental membership in a large community. Clearly the 
multi-functional character of politics. . . means that no single scale 
can be used for measuring the degree of political development.! *
Lacking consensus on the concept, researchers have tended to study poli­
tical development as (1) an integral link in the process of modernization 
or (2) the stability of specific and differentiated political institutions.
^Lucian Pye (ed.) , Communications arid Political Development (Princeton 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 16.
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An alternative has been to conceptualize various characteristics which 
are assumed to be vital dimensions of political development and to study 
such characteristics as individual concepts. After a brief look at some 
of the problems of conceptualization, various conceptual approaches to 
political development will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter.
The Relevance-Rigor Controversy 
One aspect of the problem of conceptualizing political development 
is the task of defining the relevant dimensions of the process both within 
and external to the political system. The importance of considering both 
internal and external factors has been documented by Joseph LaPalombara 
and Myron Weiner.
In recent studies of political development, political scientists have 
tended to treat the political system as a dependent phenomena, in­
fluenced in its stable or changing configurations by ecological and 
,other environment factors. .From these studies we have come increasingly 
to understand that the structures of political institutions, their 
operation, and political behavior. . . are influenced in part by such 
broad phenomena as educational systems or communications network of 
a particular society.^
In stating the case for clear and close relationships between the political
system and the socio-economic milieu, the same authors warn against the
". . . danger of an unjustifiable implication, namely, that the political
system is the outcome of environmental factors that may be stable or
o
changing through time.’ The complexity of these inter-relationships means 
that, in many cases, concepts of political development which appear most 
relevant, that is, come closest to defining phenomena in the real world, 
cannot be rigorously investigated.
^•Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "Political Parties and Political 




The low potential for operationalizing concepts such as "institutions 
of politics" or the "broader environment" has given rise to a proliferation 
of concepts which are at once more precise and more controversial. To 
render concepts both relevant and rigorous, John Crittenden points out, 
the "dominant characteristic of contemporary research on development is 
an emphasis on complex and speculative concepts based on a large number of 
empirical referrents
Coming to grips with the problem of conceptualization entails 
finding a middle ground between concepts which are accurate and relevant, 
on the one hand, and which lend themselves to precise operationalization 
on the other. As LaPalombara has later argued, "The best hope for the 
discipline’s future growth lies in the application of rigorous metho­
dologies to important problems conceptualized at the ’middle range’ and 
involving partial segments of the polity."” In devising and investigating 
concepts of political development, compromise between the relevance de­
manded by theory and the rigor demanded by research seems inevitable.
Political Development as Modernization
Daniel Lerner is a scholar who has made a satisfactory compromise.
He has maintained a high degree of relevance in providing a conceptual 
scheme of political development which has adequate operational potential.
Much like Dankwart Rustow who considers "politics, economics, sociology 
and psychology" as "many different aspects of the same seamless web of
^■Crittenden, "Modernization in the American States," p. 989.
Cf. Arthur Banks and Robert Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge, Mass.: 
M.I.T. Press, 1963) and Bruce Russet et al., World Handbook of Political 
and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
^Joseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories and Microapplications in Com­
parative Politics," Comparative Politics, I (October, 1968), p. 54.
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social reality,Lerner sees the entire social system impinging upon 
and affected by political development. For Lerner, the social system 
and political system, with all their respective function and structures, 
are inextricably bound.
Lerner argues that "two main sets of problems confront the develop­
ment process everywhere: mobility and stability."
By mobility we mean the problem of societal equilibrium. Mobility is 
the agent of social change. Only insofar as individual persons can 
change their place in the world, their positions in society, their 
own self-image does social change occur. . . . The political function 
in this process is to maintain stable controls over these rapid 
changes— i.e., to preside over a dynamic e q u i l i b r i u m . ^
The hallmark of a modern, and thus politically developed, state is, in 
Lerner*s words, an "expansive and adaptive self-system, ready to incor-
O
porate new roles and to identify personal values with public issues.
From this now popular persepctive, the goal of political develop­
ment is, in many respects, identical to the aim of modernization. Linking 
political development and modernization in a similar fashion, Lucian Pye 
sees the problem of political development as ". . . one of cultural 
diffusion and of adapting, fusing, and adjusting old patterns to new 
life demands."^ Crystallizing as a rise in social mobilization and poli­
tical participation, political development has an impact on the entire 
community.
^Dankwart Rustow, "Modernization and Comparative Politics," 
Comparative Politics, I (October, 1968), p. 40.
^Lerner, "Communications Theory of Modernization," p. 331.
^Lerner, Passing Of Traditional Society, p. 51.
^Pye, Communications and Political Development, p. 19.
Political Development as Institutionalization
An able critic of the viewpoint presented above is Samuel Huntington. 
In efforts to extract the political dimension from the larger societal con­
text, Huntington defines political development as "the institutionalization 
of political organizations and procedures." He argues that a "concept of 
political development should be reversible," that is, "define both poli­
tical development and the circumstances under which political decay is 
enc our aged." "V
In the Weberian tradition, Huntington submits four ideal types of
polities based upon his "theory" of political development and political
decay. Conceived in terms of "high" or "low" ratings on the criteria
social mobilization and political institutionalization, societies may
be categorized as having a civic ( high/high ), contained ( low/high ),
corrupt { high/low ), or primitive ( low/low ) polity. India, for example,
is depicted as a contained polity, "politically highly developed, with
modern political institutions, while still very backward in terms of 
2
modernization."
Huntington identifies public interest with "whatever strengthens 
governmental institutions" and asserts that "the public interest is the 
interest of public institutions." He then concludes: "The existence of
political institutions (such as the Presidency or Presidium) Capable of 
giving substance to public interests distinguishes politically developed 
societies from undeveloped ones."^ Because rapid social mobilization 
or increased political participation may cause demands which overload
^Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," p. 393. 
^Ibid., p . 409.
~*Ibid., p. 415 (Italics mine.)
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the political system, Huntington maintains that these phenomena often 
undermine and impede the process of political institutionalization and, 
hence, may lead to political decay.
Criticism and Synthesis
The institutional approach to political development, as presented 
by Huntington, fails completely in at least one crucial area: the problem
of transforming a contained polity, such as India, into a civic polity is 
left unexplored. In stating a sound argument for stable political insti­
tutions in changing societies, Huntington provides little insight for a 
country such as India or a state like Mississippi where political insti­
tutions are "developed" yet where economic and social development is 
severely retarded. That extreme or overly-rigid institutionalization 
of political structures may actually preclude development in other soci­
etal sectors and, perhaps, constrain the functioning of political struc­
tures themselves are major aspects of the development problem which 
Huntington apparently ignores. Highly institutionalized polities, such 
as absolute monarchies, Communist regimes, and elitist state governments, 
appear to do little to enhance— and may often thwart— certain moderni­
zation goals.
The modernization approach to political development, as advanced by 
Lerner and many others, is equally unsatisfactory in at least one respect. 
The general tendency of those linking modernization and political develop­
ment has been to equate one "good" (modernization) with another "good" 
(political development), while leaving the task of defining "good" to the 
reader*s vivid imagination. Lerner, in marking empathy as the all important 
link between what may be inferred to be a democratic society and a demo­
cratic polity, comes closer than most. Nonetheless, even here, empathy 
is at best merely a crucial vehicle whose destination is never clearly
specified.
The point to be made here can be simply put: Even though a
political scientist can never prove the "goodness” or "correctness" 
or intrinsic value of the goal or destination he researches, he never­
theless is obliged to define the goal as explicitly and forthrightly 
as possible. The tendency to define only intermediate or instrumental 
goals, such as social mobilization, political participation or political 
institutionalization, casts doubts about— if not totally obscures*— what 
the researcher’s notion of political development really is. Because 
non-scientific, essentially metaphysical value orientations mold the 
researcher’s notion of political development, it would seem advantageous, 
seemingly crucial for interpretive purposes, to sketch the basic values 
molding non-operational notions.^
-Thus, the following statement of this researcher’s value orienta­
tions to the problem of political development is not intended as sheer 
rhetoric; nor is it given to initiate polemic discourse. Rather, these 
statements represent the simplest beliefs which led this researcher to 
accept the pluralist concept of political development discussed in the 
next section. For the sake of brevity, they can be listed as follows:
(1) The individual is valued more highly than any group, organization, 
state, or nation.
(2) The security, freedom, and dignity of the individual is valued as 
the highest order "good."
(3) The goal of modernization and political development is to maximize
■^ Cf* Seymour M. Lipset’s introduction, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y. 
Doubleday, 1963).
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the security, freedom, and dignity of each and every individual.
(4) Political institutions and practices are not valued of themselves 
but only insofar as they are instrument! in realizing this goal.
(5) Democratic political institutions and practices, as classically 
defined, favor the realization of this goal more than non-democratic.
Perhaps, then, in the light of these unproven, non-testable assertions, 
the relevance of the pluralist concept of political development can be 
seen for what it truly is: a ward against scientific yet essentially
sterile investigations of political development. Based on an 11. . .aware­
ness of the experience of the human race in historical times and not just 
contemporary primitive and advanced western societies,"^ the pluralist 
concept offers a somewhat transcendental approach to political develop­
ment.
The Pluralist Approach to Political Development
William McCord has labeled the European experience of the 18th 
and 19th centuries as the "first springtime of freedom." He observes 
that liberal forces there "confronted challenges from the old aristocra­
cies resembling those faced by progressive movements in contemporary 
developing states." He outlines the following interpretations of why 
some states "leaped to freedom" in this period while others did not:
(1) Economic development - This school subscribes to the belief that 
economic abundance attenuates class differences and thus lays the 
foundations for functioning democracy. Pointing to the findings of 
Lipset, McCord argues that such correlations may more reasonably be 
read as indications that a "stable, liberal democracy creates more
^Shils, "The Comparative Study of New States," p. 12
^William McCord, The Springtime of Freedom (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1965), p. 249.
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doctors or telephones or literacy, rather than the reverse."
(2) Ideology — This school, led by Massimo Salvadori, contends that 
new and unique ideas borne of the Enlightenment and Age of Reason 
nurtured the blossoming of liberal democracy. McCord welcomes 
SalvadoriTs emphasis on ideological commitment as a needed antidote 
for the implacable economic forces thesis, but notes that "it smacks 
of Hegelianism to suggest that philosophies, abstractly floating 
above social reality, totally created a new society."
(3) Homogeneity and Institutionalization - A fully liberal polity, 
according to this school, stems from national homogeneity which per­
mits the establishment of electoral and political structures compel­
ling compromise and long practice in self-government. In criticizing 
this thesis, McCord cites many "examples of nations which lacked these 
advantages, but still managed to evolve a liberal political structure."
(4) Pluralism — This school incorporates several theses of political 
and social development. It maintains "that a liberal political struc­
ture grows only in a society characterized by multiple economic checks 
and balances; . . .  It distrusts a society in which a single group 
(whether a feudal aristocracy, a Brahmin caste, corporation executives, 
or the government) has unchallengable economic power, for in this envi­
ronment political absolutism finds its natural habitat."^
In prescribing certain goals for developing societies, McCordTs 
pluralist concept of political development is clearly a normative one.
This concept prizes a liberal, democratic polity and defines its evolution 
in terms of an open socio-economic milieu. The pluralist " . . .  wishes to
^Ibid., pp. 249-54, passim.
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abolish privilege, end economic serfdom, and extend equality of opportunity 
to all." Political development, then, "should be measured in terms of the 
degree to which it ends suffering, enhances individual dignity, and widens 
the possibility of free choice."^ Although no amount of research can 
yield empirical evidence supporting these goals in absolute terms, their 
relative merits, their conditions and consequences, and their implementa­
tion can be studied scientifically.
A Concept of Democratic Political Development
The several conceptual approaches to political development dis­
cussed above are marked by varying degrees of relevance and operational 
potential. Nonetheless, the contribution of such concepts to research 
and theory is mainly heuristic. All of them require more precise defi­
nition. None of them, as presented by various authors, are suited for 
^rigorous operationalization. If the interest of Political Science is the 
building of knowledge about political phenomena, then the discipline must 
demand that speculation and intuition either be shaped into testable hypo­
theses or eschewed.
In efforts to render the pluralist concept operational, political 
development will be limited for this thesis to Democratic Political Devel­
opment. By making the concept specific in this way, one may identify 
desired ends of the development process without making their ultimate 
value the subject of inquiry. Democratic Political Development, as dis­
cussed in the following chapters, is investigated as an empirical— not a 
normative— concept.
3-Ibid., p. 281.
Although various dimensions of democratic political development, 
such as legitimacy, participation, equalitarianism, consensus, and effect' 
ive opposition to the "ins," are recognized, this research attempts to 
study the correlates of only selected dimensions. Democratic Political 
Development, as conceptualized here, describes a dynamic process of 
diffusion between the polity and society characterized by rising levels 
of political participation and competition for authoritative decision­
making positions. Voter turnout and inter-party competition are the 
specific indicators used to investigate this concept.
CHAPTER III
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A NASCENT THEORY
As noted in the previous chapter, political scientists have hardly 
formed a united front in their efforts to build a theory of political 
development. In a way, this is a healthy sign; it recognizes, at least 
tacitly, that theory could at best only superficially grasp the com­
plex phenomena of political development. This realization has ushered 
in a growing interest in types of political development and an effort to 
build developmental theories of selected polity types.
Democratic Political Development
Westerners, in particular, as members of democratic polities 
have frequently studied the conditions which give birth to and nurture 
democracy. More often than not, however, the blatant assumption that 
political development and democracy are one and the same is applied as 
an unstated premise. The pitfalls of equating the two are confounded 
further by poor, inadequate conceptualizations of democracy.
In the interest of more rigorous research, it appears that students 
must be content to settle for something less than an all-encompassing 
concept of democratic political development. They must eschew the risks 
of explaining nothing in their attempts to explain everything. As noted 
in the previous chapter, the development, the conditions and consequences, 
of democratic governance has been variously studied. Indeed, the voluminous 
bulk of literature on the subject is so vast that one might justifi-
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ably be appalled by the dearth of scientific knowledge about democracy.
The virtues of citizenship, perhaps the distinguishing feature of 
democracy, have been defended by Aristotle and Rousseau. These thinkers 
together with many othershave argued that individuals should govern 
their own destinies. Contemporary scholars as well have tended to accept 
popular sovereignty and its host of democratic corollaries (such as 
majority rule, minority rights, political equality, limited government 
and so on) as desirable political goals; and have tried to explain what 
conditions enhance democracy and how this type of government affects 
man and society.
Whether the geographic focus has been a single nation or a cross- 
cultural comparison, diversity in both form and substance among allegedly 
democratic regimes has been noted. The plight of post-colonial regimes, 
in particular, has significantly illustrated that prescribed forms—  
revered democratic structures— may not actually function "democratically.”
This realization has, in large part, precipitated the current focus on 
environment and government as intimate factors of democratic political 
development.
Lipset * s Study of DemocracyT s Social Requisites
Seymour Martin Lipset, a pioneer in the scientific study of demo­
cratic political development, has investigated the "existence and stability 
of democratic society. . . from a sociological and behavioral standpoint."
In order to construct a theory of democratic political development,
Lipset maintains, "One must be able to point to a set of conditions that 
have actually existed in a number of countries, and say:"
. . . democracy has emerged out of these conditions, and has become 
stabilized because of certain supporting institutions and values, as
well as because of its own internal self-maintaining processes.^" 
Democracy, as defined by Lipset, is "a political system which supplies 
regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials," 
permitting ". .' . the largest possible part of the population to influence 
[decision-making] through their ability to choose among alternative con- 
tenders for political office."
Operationalizing this concept, Lipset applies the criteria (1) un- 
interupted continuance of political democracy since World War I, and
(2) absence of major political movements opposed to democratic "rules of 
the game" (i.e., totalitarian factions received less than 20 per cent of 
the vote in any election over the past 25 years), to locate thirteen Stable 
democracies and fifteen unstable democracies and dictatorships among 
European and English-speaking nations. Expertise opinions are used to 
locate^ seven .democracies and unstable dictatorships and thirteen stable 
dictatorships among Latin American countries. Proceeding from these 
four classifications, LipsetTs analysis of quantitative data and historical 
records leads him to conclude that economic development (wealth, industri­
alization, education, and urbanization) and legitimacy (effectiveness in 
maximizing constituency satisfaction and minimizing disruptive cleavages) 
are social requisites of democracy.
So far as operationalizing the social requisites is concerned, no 
attempt is made to quantify legitimacy. Regarding economic development, 
Lipset calculates the mean score and range of variation on each indicator 
of Wealth (Per capita income, population/doctors, population/motor vehicles, 
telephones/population, radios/population, and newspaper copies/population), 
Industrialization (Per cent males in agriculture and per capita energy 
consumption), Education (Per cent literate, primary education enrollment, 
post-primary education enrollment, and higher education enrollment/population)
^Lipset, "Social Requisites of Democracy," p. 69. ^Ibid., p. 71.
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and Urbanization (Per cent in cities over 20,000; 100,000; and in metro­
politan areas) for each of his four political classification. While 
the mean scores on each economic development indicator can be seen to 
favor the more democratic countries, the considerable overlap in the 
ranges of the scores among the four classifications makes conclusive 
interpretations difficult.
As a step toward scientific theorizing about political development, 
Lipset*s study can be challenged on at least two grounds. First, democracy 
is operationalized as a dichotomous variable, making comparisons with the 
continuously scaled economic development variables difficult. Second, 
this key variable is operationalized largely on the basis of intuitive 
judgements, making valid replications difficult. Although an attempt is 
made to temper the subjectivity of categorization, Lipsetfs conclusions 
about democratic development are primarily based on speculative labels 
marking each regime as democratic or not.
Although a significant addition to democratic study, Lipsetfs work 
was most important for the subsequent work it inspired. In one such work, 
to be discussed below, Phillips Cutright has operationalized democratic 
political development as a continuous variable with empirical referrents.
Before turning to this study, however, it will be necessary to examine 
briefly some other foundations of Cutright’s research.
Lerner * s Theory of Political Modernization 
In part, the theoretical groundwork for Cutright*s cross-national 
study of "national political development" was laid by Daniel Lerner. His 
Study of modernization in the Middle East stems from a survey of six coun­
tries (Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iran) Conducted in 
1950-51 to investigate the relationships between urbanization, literacy,
media consumption and production, and political participation.Although 
Lerner’s admitted concern is political development, his actual concern-—  
as may be inferred from his choice of voter turnout as the political 
indicator— is democratic political development. This he esteems as the 
"crowning institution of participant society."
Lerner highlights the importance of configurational analysis in 
stressing the unstabilizing impact of disproportionate changes in one or 
more of the variables listed above. Egypt, for example, which scores 
high on urbanization yet very low on literacy, is contrasted with Turkey 
where improvements in each variable describe a more even pace of change.
In pointing to this finding as a possible explanation of Turkey’s rela­
tively more "democratic" regime, Lerner sets the stage for presenting 
a theory which directly and intimately relates democratic political 
development and modernization.
Empathy, "the general capacity to see oneself in the other fellow’s
situation," is considered by Lerner as a bridge juxtaposing traditional
and modern, participant society.
Traditional society is non-participant— it deploys people by kinship 
into communities isolated from each other and from a center; . . . 
it develops few needs of interdependence; lacking the bonds of inter­
dependence, people’s horizons are limited by locale and their decisions 
involve only other known people in known situations. . . . Modern 
society is participant in that it functions by ’consensus’—  
individuals making personal decisions on public issues must concur 
often enough with other individuals they do not know to make possible 
a stable common governance.^
Inasmuch as urbanization, education, and communications break down
parochial barriers and thus enhance the individual’s capacity to
■^Lerner, Passing of Traditional Society.
Ibid., p. 49. 
^Ibid., p. 50
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empathize, Lerner reasons, the foundations for consensus and parti­
cipation in political decision-making are laid. Because modern society 
is characterized by empathy ("the inner mechanism which enables newly 
mobile persons to operate efficiently in a changing world"^), it facili­
tates consensus and thus makes possible a "stable common governance," 
democracy that is.
Lerner does more, however, than merely observe this link between
modernization and political development. He specifies the key variables
and postulates the sequencial stages of democratic political development.
The secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a 
regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization . . . literacy and 
media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, 
for the literate develop the media which in turn spread literacy. . . .
Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation 
. . . which we find in all advanced modern societies.2
While addressing himself to the problems of political development and 
modernization in transitional societies of the Middle East, Lerner pro­
vides a theory of democratic political development which can be investi­
gated scientifically. A number of testable hypotheses can be drawn from 
this theory, and they and their corollaries can be studied systematically 
in a variety of environmental settings. Such investigations may assume a 
broad cross-national focus, as did Cutright*s, or a limited focus on a 
cluster of polities having similar characteristics, such as southern 
states.
Cutright* s Study of Political Development




political development, has constructed an index of political development 
which, he claims, is more removed ". . . from the world of ethnocentric 
judgments about the goodness or evil of political systems. . . ."1 
Employing seventy-seven nations as the units of analysis, Cutright has 
investigated the environmental correlates of what he labels "national 
political development."
A basic criticism of Lipset which apparently guided CutrightTs
research deserves specific mention.
It makes little difference that in the verbal discussion of national 
political systems one talks about shades of democracy if, in the 
statistical assessment, one cannot distinguish among nations. . . .
One cannot distinguish among. . . political systems without a scoring 
system that assigns values. . . according to some stated criteria.^
CutrightTs disciplined efforts to index political development as a con­
tinuous variable and, hence, permit statistical assessments of the poli­
tical as well as the environmental aspects of development is no small 
contribution. Nonetheless, his critical remarks concerning heretofore 
inadequacies in conceptualizing the political variable— specifically 
referring to a ". . . value laden curiosity about democracies and dicta­
torships. . — is somewhat ironic, if not hypocritical. In other words,
although he does submit a non-value laden concept of political development, 
his operational definition appears to be a quite valid measure of democra­
tic political development as defined by Lipset. "A careful examination of 
CutrightTs political development scoring procedure indicates reliance on 
the same standards utilized by Lipset."^
3-Cutright, "National Political Development," p. 253.
2Ibid., p. 254.
3Ibid#,, p. 254.
4 M c C r o n e  and Cnudde, "Causal Model of Democratic Political Devel­
opment," p. 73.
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Cutright notes that "the concept that guided construction of the 
index can be stated simply— a politically developed nation has more complex 
and speciallized national political institutions than a less politically 
developed nation."^ Yet, his criteria for assigning the points that are 
accumulated to yield an index of political development for each country 
are clearly "value laden," as he himself would put it. The political devel­
opment scores over the 21-year period 1940-1960 are attained by totalling 
the points assigned to each country each year as described below:
Criteria
"Legislative Branch of Government":
Existence of self-governing parliament wherein the 
lower or only chamber was represented by two or more 
parties and the non-major parties held at least 30 
per cent of the seats.
Same as above except "30 per cent rule" not applicable.
Members not affiliated with political parties, or, 
Parliament is not self-governing.
"Executive Branch of Government":
Ruling chief executive selected by (a) direct vote in 
open election with competition, or (b) political party 
in multi-party parliament as defined by "30 per cent rule."
Ruling chief executive selected on non-hereditary basis.
Hereditary ruler.
A nation may obtain 0 to 3 points per year or a maximum cumulative score 
of 63.
CutrightTs inclusion of such notions as self-governing parliaments, 
major and minor parties, and direct and open elections as the basic criteria 
in constructing his political development index tends to rebuke his earlier 
criticism of value laden concepts. Unless, perhaps, he could justify value
Possible points








3-Cutright, "National Political Development," p. 255. 
^Ibid.» p. 256.
laden operational definitions but not concepts. While Cutrightfs concept 
represents an attempt to detach values, such as a researcher’s preference 
for democratic governance, from empirical investigation, his operational 
procedures tacitly indicate that developed political structures function 
more democratically than less developed political structures. In this light 
OutrightTs contribution to theory building can be seen not as a value- 
free measure but rather one which 11. . . transforms Lipset’s democratic 
attributes into a continuous variable.
Outrightfs choice of indicators for urbanization, communications, 
education, and agricultural development are not dissimilar from those in­
vestigated by Lipset. A standardizing procedure, the T-scoring method,2 
is used to collapse the various measures into single, scaled indicators 
of Urbanization (Per cent in cities over 100,000), Education (literacy 
and higher education enrollment), Communications (newspaper readers, 
newsprint consumption, domestic mail volume, and telephones per capita), 
and Agricultural Development (Per cent economically active labor force 
in agriculture). Each of these scales is correlated with the political 
development scale. Outright reports high zero-order correlation coeffi­
cients between political development and urbanization (.69), education (.74) 
and communications (.81).
•^ -McCrone and Cnudde, "Causal Model of Democratic Political Devel­
opment," p. 73.
^This procedure, so labeled by Allen S. Edwards, Statistical 
Methods for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1954), p. I60ff., is analogous to the jz scoring procedures 
for standardization in general statistics, whereby the mean is set at 
zero and the standard deviation at one. By inflating the mean and accord­
ingly adjusting the standard deviation, T-scoring eliminates minus 
scores and facillitates comparisons among different measures, such as 
dollars, per cent, median number of years, and so forth.
Commending LipsetTs conceptualization and Cutrightfs operationaliza­
tion, McCr one and Cnudde point out that neither study, however, provides 
"theoretical formulations of the process of democratic political develop­
ment." To • .provide a basis for inferring causal relationships by 
distinguishing between spurious correlations and indirect and direct effects, 
McCrone and Cnudde turn to the theory offered by Lerner. To ". . . derive 
explanatory propositions concerning the process of democratic political 
development," they turn to the methodology offered by Blalock to formulate 
and test an empirical model.^ Their model, a Communications Model of 
democratic political development, is discussed in Chapter IV. Before 
turning to this model, a few general comments about cross-national studies, 
correlation analysis, and theory development are in order.
Some Problems of Cross-National Studies
Granted that the construction of political development theories 
involves generalization, the inherent problems of generalizing from co­
relation studies, particularly those assuming a cross-national or cross- 
cultural focus, deserve mention. The basic problem stems from the tendency 
to ignore or underestimate the importance of cluster variations, that is 
variations which cannot be readily attributed to chance and which may, on 
the other hand, be a function of peculiar factors that are both discernable 
and measurable.
For example, if one selects a set of 100 observations, objectively 
scores each observation on three characteristics (X, Y, and Z), and then 
attempts to generalize about the inter-relationships of the characteristics
^McCrone and Cnudde, "Causal Model of Democratic Political Devel­
opment," p. 72.
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for his set of observations, he may begin by plotting a scattergrara 
for characteristics X and Y. A hypothetical scattergram for this 







After fitting a regression line to his data, he may find that the cor­
relation and regression coefficients are the same and equal .70. On the 
basis of this statistical assessment, he may then infer that, generally, 
as X increases, Y increases similarly. On the other hand, upon studying 
his scattergram more closely, he may observe the cluster of dots in the 
lower right-hand corner for which the effect of Y on X is noticably less, 
or perhaps non-existent. In efforts to satiate his intellectual curiosity, 
he decides to note the score on the Z characteristic for each of the 
cluster dots. In finding that nearly all the cluster units have a very 
low score on Z, he may surmise that Z has a peculiar influence on the 
association between X and Y for this particular cluster of units. To 
test his hunch, he may undertake further research to ascertain and attempt 
to explain the cluster unit's apparent uniqueness.
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Outright*s attempt to discern problems of political development 
in terms of relative "over" or "under" development in environmental sec­
tors illustrates the pitfalls of over-generalizing. The possibility— and 
I would argue probability— that the nature and sequence of political 
development may differ in varied environmental settings is only mentioned 
parenthetically by Outright; and the analysis of cluster variations needed 
to make judgements is obscured by correlation analysis. After filling 
several pages with rhetoric about the relative importance of various environ­
mental factors on political development, depicting the regression line as 
equilibrium points for the communications and political development rela­
tionship, and providing a lengthy table of residual error of prediction 
scores (i.e., each country's predicted political score subtracted from its 
actual score), Outright notes for the careful reader:
. . (one could have had several equilibrium points simply if diff­
erent clusters of nations had different regression lines, a possibility 
to be explored in later research). . . .1
The error of prediction scores calculated by Outright do in fact 
indicate that geographic location is at least one significant variable of 
political development. Asian and Eastern European countries in particular 
tend to scatter on the "under" politically developed side of OutrightTs 
regression line. His scattergram reveals relatively high communications 
scores among Eastern European or communist countries, yet relatively low 
scores on the political development index. Less salient evidences of 
clustering, however, is obscured by the inherent limitations of applying 
correlation analysis to such a large and diverse universe of nations.
In summary, it can be noted that Outright*s residual error of
-^Outright, "National Political Development," p. ‘258.
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prediction technique is at most a statistical method for identifying 
units with an "over” or "under" political development problem. It must 
be stressed, however, that if one equates the regression line with a 
series of statistically determined equilibrium points, as Outright does, 
such equilibrium points hold only for the One Set of data which was fitted 
to the regression line. To maintain that this one regression line describes 
equilibrium points for each of the seventy-seven nations is tantamount to 
arguing that the process of political development is ubiquitous. Clearly, 
there may be peculiar factors operating in unique settings which pre-empt 
the anticipated relationship between communications and political develop­
ment. The point here is not to degrade correlation analysis or to discard 
the deviant cases as hopeless cases. Rather, the limitations of applying 
correlation analysis to a diverse universe are pointed out to highlight 
the advantage of grouping deviant cases and defining clusters for more 
intensive study.
Choosing Appropriate Analytic Units
In discussing the broad outline of issues important to comparative 
research and developmental theory, the basic dilemma of choosing suitable 
analytic units has perhaps been obscured. This dilemma of whether to focus 
on a large number of diverse units or to limit oneself to smaller, more 
homogenous units dissimilar enough to make comparisons among them interesting 
is a peremptory concern.
One way to escape this dilemma is to utilize a standard, yet rela­
tively flexible, framework in studying divergent areas. Through the appli­
cation of disciplined methodologies, researchers could attach new and explan­
atory meaning to the significance of deviation from a model. Once it is
clear that democratic political development in certain states and configu­
rations of societies does not proceed in the manner postulated by a general 
theory, typologies differentiating polities according to their peculiar 
ecological matrix and the manner in which they deviate from the theory 
can be contructed. Such typologies— with precise, empirical referrents 
— should suggest new and revised theories and models specifying distinct 
sets of variables and variable inter-actions.
An integrated network of democratic political development theories, 
combining the orientations and procedures of research and theory building 
sketched above, is not a mere pipedream for the future. The pioneering 
works of Lerner, Lipset, Outright, and McCrone and Cnudde mark a path of 
research and theory building endeavors which, if pursued cautiously, stead­
fastly, and imaginatively, can lead to a fuller and more accurate under­




Lerner*s theory of democratic political development, in spite of 
Cutright's corroborative research findings, remains speculative. This 
state of affairs illustrates the gap between research and theory dis­
cussed in Chapter II. Transposing the empirical findings of research 
into theories is indeed a problem for which there are no simple formulas.
Donald McCrone and Charles Cnudde, however, have raised one crucial 
problem of transposing research findings into theories of political devel­
opment : causality.
The construction of an empirical theory of democratic political 
development is dependent on the formulation of causal propositions 
which are generalizations of the developmental process. . . .
The next major task is the formulation and testing of empirical 
models of democratic political development which provide a basis 
for inferring causal relationships by distinguishing between spu­
rious correlations and indirect and direct effects.
Yet, more than just recognizing this problem, they have attempted to 
apply methods designed to aid in formulating causal propositions. Theory 
building techniques, such as the Simon-Blalock technique of model con­
struction and causal inferrence, provide needed assistance in coming 
to grips with the problem of causality.




Model Construction and Theory Building 
Relying on two theory building techniques, Simon-Blalock causal 
model analysis and path coefficients, McCrone and Cnudde project a causal 
model which, in their words, "represents the beginnings of a parsimonious 
theory of democratic political development." Adopting Lerner's "concept­
ualization of political development as a developmental sequence" as the 
theoretical basis for formulating causal propositions and Lipset's focus 
on democracy as the dependent variable, they emphasize communications 
development as a prerequisite to a successfully functioning political 
democracy. "Both normative and empirical theory point to communications," 
they argue, as the crucial variable of democratic political development.'*'
Urbanization and Education, together with Communications and Democra­
tic Political Development, are the concepts investigated in this analysis.
Using the correlation coefficients among these variables derived by 
Cutright, McCrone and Cnudde employ model construction and causal inferrence 
techniques to transpose correlation data into theoretical formulations 
of the process of democratic political development.
McCrone and Cnudde's Simplifying Assumptions
Before turning to the MeCrone-Cnudde model of democratic political
development and to the theoretical propositions derived therefrom, the
fundamental assumptions upon which this model is based must be recounted.
. . . political development is assumed to be the dependent variable 
and urbanization is conceived not to be dependent on any other vari­
able in the system. Second, relationships between the variables in 
the system are assumed to be additive and linear. Third, other causes 
of each of the four variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with the
t
Ibid., pp. 74-5, passim.
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other variables in the system. And fourth, it is necessary to assume 
uni-directional causation.
The authors recognize uni-direct ional causation as the least desirable
assumption. However, remembering Blalock's rule of thumb (Donlt be afraid
to over-simplify reality. It will always be possible to introduce com-
oplexities a few at a time), this assumption should not alter unduly 
conclusions about the developmental sequence drawn from this type of 
analysis.
A less satisfactory assumption, which casts doubts on the theoretical 
basis of the model, is that Urbanization is not dependent on any other 
variable in the system. In other words, increases in the level of urbani­
zation cannot be attributed to changes in the variables Education, Communi­
cations, or Democratic Political Development. The questionability of this 
assumption will be explored more fully in connection with southern poli­
tical development in a subsequent chapter.
A Communications Model of 
Democratic Political Development 
The Communications Model of democratic political development, as 
presented by McCrone and Cnudde, is depicted in Figure 2. Several alter­
native models were investigated and then rejected by McCrone and Cnudde, 
using the Simon-Blalock technique discussed earlier. This final model-- 
linking Urbanization (U), Education (E), Communications (C), and Democratic 
Political Development (D) in a developmental sequence--was accepted after 
the analysis of path coefficients indicated that the indirect link (the
*Ibid., p. 73.
¥Blalock. Methodology in Social Research, p. 371.
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causal path Urbanization-Education-Communications-Democratic Political 
Development) accounted for the direct relationship between Urbanization 
and Democratic Political Development. ( See Figure 3. )
The following empirical propositions were derived from this 
causal model of democratic political development:
1. Democratic political development occurs when mass communications 
permeate society. Education affects democratic political development 
by contributing to the growth of mass communications, therefore:
2. Mass communications occurs when literacy and educational levels 
rise in society. Urbanization affects democratic political devel­
opment primarily by increasing educational levels, which then 
increase mass communications, therefore:
3. Education and literacy development occur in urbanizing societies.
This causal model, in the authors' words, "is a series of inter-related 
causal propositions which link urbanization through a developmental 
sequence to democratic political development.
The, s.jgnif icanc e.. p f. „lhis._MQ.de.l 
McCrone and Cnudde do more than transpose Outright's research 
into a causal model of political development. They do more, also, 
than deduce from Lipset's and Lerner's speculations the beginnings of 
an empirical theory of democratic political development. Most signifi­
cantly, they apply methods of simplifying a tremendously complex 
process for analytical purposes. The utility of theory building tech­
niques in narrowing the gap between research and theory is aptly demon­
strated.
^McCrone and Cnudde, "Causal Model of Democratic Political 
Development," p. 78.
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A variety of causal inference techniques involving the con­
struction of simplifying models, similar to those applied by McCrone 
and Cnudde, are available. Such techniques would appear to be necessary 
tools for creating some theoretical order, however artificial for the 
moment, out of the now substantial body of correlational research. 
Because it only indicates association, never causation, correlation 
analysis can never be a high powered theoretical tool.
Techniques of causal inference, however, applied cautiously 
and imaginatively, can be used to refine the implications of corre­
lational data by . . distinguishing between spurious correlations 
and indirect and direct e f f e c t s A l t h o u g h  these techniques require 
initial simplification of developmental data, they can subsequently 
be used to build sophisticated models of development more in keeping 
with the complexities of the real world. Used together, correlation 
analysis and causal inference techniques can provide invaluable assist­
ance in constructing more elaborate models of democratic political 
development.
As additional causal variables are identified and included, the 
model of democratic political development will begin to match the 
complexity of the phenomena which it seeks to explain. . . .
A second form of elaboration is the introduction of new dependent 
variables. In this manner, we can guage the effects of democratic 
political development. By the introduction of measures of welfare, 
education, and military expenditure into the model, we can measure 
the effects of both democratic political systems and the causal 
factors in development on public policy.2
Thus, provisions are made for introducing new variables which either
affect or are affected by variables already included in the system.
^Tbid. , p. 72. 
2
Ibid., p. 79 .
Figure 2
Communications Model of Democratic Political Development
Figure 3
Direct and Indirect Causal Paths in Communications Model
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Public Policy and the Consequences of 
Democratic Political Development
The McCrone-Cnudde model depicts in abbreviated terms three 
conditions--Urbanization, Education, and Communications--which give 
rise to democratic governance. As the authors stressed above, similar 
techniques can be used to elaborate or extend this model so as to in­
clude the consequences, as well as some additional conditions, of 
democratic political development.
Extending his empirical study of democracy’s social requisites, 
Lipset argues that there are certain ’’consequences of an existent 
democratic system."^ Some of these consequences, such as an open 
class system, an equalitarian value system, and literacy, he main­
tains, function to sustain democracy; while others, such as political 
apathy, bureaucracy, and mass society, "may have the effect of under­
mining democracy." Lipset, however, and this point is to be stressed, 
offers no empirical evidence to substantiate his claims that demo­
cratic systems yield certain consequences.
Until recently, in fact, a general assumption of many researchers 
was that democratic political institutions produce certain desirable 
consequences. A growing body of public policy researches has at last 
cast considerable doubt on such assumptions. Comparative studies of 
political and ecological systems in the American states, in particular, 
have raised the questions: What, if any, independent effect do demo­
cratic political institutions--such as voter participation and inter­
party competition--have on public policy? And, in turn, what effect
X
Lipset, "Social Requisites of Democracy," p. 105.
does public policy have on society?
In casting doubts on much of Political Science's conventional 
wisdom, the conclusions of researchers comparatively studying the 
American states are quite relevant to studies of developing areas.
The stress laid by students of development on the institutionalization 
of political structures which function to enhance levels of partici­
pation and competition and bureaucratic efficiency may be unwarranted 
and elusive if the findings from the American states, which indicate 
low intervening effects of political variables and the greater signi­
ficance of socio-economic variables on public policy, are accepted.
. . . the message that emerges from these studies asserts the need 
for investigating the states' historical and socioeconomic environ­
ments in order to explain the levels and variations in policy 
patterns.^
The remaining task for the student of comparative politics,
Richard Hofferbert points out, whether his. units of analysis are Ameri­
can states or non-western polities, is two-fold:
On the one hand, we must account for the 'why' of the relationship 
between social development and policy. . . . But we must also 
attempt to account for the variance left unexplained by that partic­
ular mode of inquiry.2
Because in studying developing areas abroad the tendency has been to 
concentrate on the conditions which nurture democracy; and because the 
implications of recent researches regarding the consequences of selected 
democratic political institutions in the American states have been dis­
paraging; it appears that both conditions and consequences warrant 
investigation by students of democratic political development--whatever 
the geographic field of inquiry.
^■Richard I. Hofferbert, "Elite Influence in Policy Formation: A 
Model for Comparative Inquiry," paper presented at 1968 Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Washington-Hilton Hotel, 
Washington, D.C., September 2-7, p. 2. ^Ibid., p. 5.
The Utility of Models
The utility of models of democratic political development, such 
as McCrone and Cnudde's, in assisting students to grasp the fundamental 
relationships between democratic political structures and their condi­
tions and consequences should be obvious. What may not be obvious is 
that, at the present time, causal propositions and hence theories of 
democratic political development derived from such models offer the 
most reliable method of integrating discrete research projects into 
sound, empirical theories of democratic political development. "In 
regards to the subject of theory building in political science, the 
cumulative nature of empirical model building needs to be stressed."^
The careful and creative testing of models, such as the Communica­
tions Model of Democratic Political Development presented above, with 
varied analytic units can provide methodological grounds for circum­
scribing types of political systems, their conditions and consequences, 
and distinct levels and processes of political development. This 
approach recognizes, at least tacitly, that political development may 
not be a generic process and that the development of political system 
types may depend upon environmental configurations. The effects of 
environmental factors on the process of political development, and vice 
versa, may be discerned more accurately in terms of specific socio­
economic or psycho-cultural settings. Such an approach could lead to 
more refined and precise typologies of political systems and the pro­
cesses of their respective development.
^McCrone and Cnudde, "Causal Model of Democratic Political 
Development," p. 72.
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An effort to document the utility of model construction and 
replication of studies testing similar models is made in Chapter VI. 
The investigation of Southern Democratic Political Development in 
terms of the Communications Model of Democratic Political Development 
is intended as a modest step in the direction of empirical theory 
building. The potential pay-off of such a study cannot be realized, 
however, until a number of similar research projects applying the 
same model to different analytic clusters have been explored. The 
advancement of empirical theories of democratic political development 
depends, in large part, upon the comparison, analysis, and categori­
zation of findings obtained through disciplined research projects 
applying a singular method, preferably a simplifying model, and 
exploring a broad range of environmental settings.
CHAPTER V
THE SOUTH: AMERICATS OWN DEVELOPING AREA
The American South, in spite of the influencial role its people
have played in shaping the most modern, most affluent, and most democratic
nation in the world, remains an area little understood by political scientists.
The South is the closest approximation to a traditional society that 
we have in the 'United States today. It is America’s own ’underdeveloped 
area,’ bound by a reverance for history and custom and built on the 
basis of a near peasantry.^
The availibility of aggregate data and the assessibility of the region, 
together with the South’s mysterious combination of diversity and homo­
geneity, are practical considerations which suggest researching the 
nature and scope of political development in this area. The extent to 
which the South is similar to other developing areas is the extent to 
which investigations of the South can enrich political development theories.
A Typology of Development 
James Coleman’s typology differentiating traditional, transitional, 
and modern societies has gained wide acceptance, as frequent allusions to
O
these concepts in the literature indicate. Yet, as often as the concepts 
are employed and as useful as they have been in denoting levels of devel-
^Donald Matthews and James Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern 
Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1966), p. 298.
A
Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the 
Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).
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opment, they remain imprecise.
Modern societies, as depicted by Dankwart Rustow, are character­
ized by a . . widening control over nature through closer co-operation
among men.’^  "High individual aspirations, geographic and social mobility,
2and a faith in rationality rather than custom. . ." are the marks of 
modern society. Traditional societies, on the other hand, are bound by 
o . a reverance for the past, a passive acceptance of the present, and 
a fatalism about the future.'
Between these two intellectual constructs rests an ill-defined, yet 
extensive, area labeled "transitional." Serving as something of a residual 
concept, transitional societies are characterized by both modernity and 
tradition. These dichotomous distinctions, then, are really "shorthand 
for continua: no real-world community is entirely one or the other. Thus,
the distinction between a 'traditional' and a 'modern' society is admit­
tedly gross, but it is an important one to make if we are to understand 
today's changing world."^
The South: A Transitional Society
Students of political development are primarily concerned with 
political communities falling mid-way along this continua. The eleven 
once-Confederate states of the South, as a sub-region of the United States, 
evidence together and severally characteristics of both modernity and tradi­
3-Rustow, "Modernization and Comparative Politics," p. 40.




tion. The urban, industrial, and essentially modern areas around Atlanta,
Miami, Dallas, New Orleans, the nation’s capital and Richmond, to mention
a few, stand out in sharp contrast to southern rural areas which in many
ways typify the South:
The rural and small-town South is still, in quite a large degree, a 
’traditional’ society; one of ’status’ rather than ’contract,’ of 
’Gemeinschaft* rather than ’Gesselschaft,’ of ’ascription’ rather 
than Tachievement,’ of ’locals’ rather than ’cosmopolitans.’!
Not only does the South differ from the rest of the nation in 
levels of urbanization and industrialization, political participation and 
political competition, and educational attainment, but, also, and more 
importantly, in basic attitudes about the self, inter-personal relationships, 
and government. Some of the differences in political knowledge and prac­
tices and basic attitudes between southerners and non-southerners is 
illustrated in Table 1. This information, derived from a cross-national 
survey of political culture, suggests interesting disparities between the 
southern sample (drawn from Mississippi, Alabama, Kentucky and Tennessee) 
and the sample for the remainder of the United States. Southerners, for 
example, appear more likely not to understand political issues (Question 15) 
and less likely to try to keep informed (Question 11a). The propensity to 
attempt to influence political decisions (Question 24) is nearly three times 
higher in the remainder of the United States than in the South. That this 
apparently low sense of political efficacy among southerners applies to 
local as well as state and national affairs is suggested by the response 
to Question 23. Responses to Questions 35, 72f, 72h, and 82 may be inter-
!lbid., p. 261.
^Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1963). The information in Table 1 was gleaned 
from Almond and Verba’s survey of the United States.
preted as indications of a higher level of fatalism— about economic, social 
as well as political life— among southerners.
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from these data is that the 
South represents a distinct region or sub-culture of the United States. 
Further, the generally subjective orientations of southerners to political 
life suggest the existence of a southern political culture similar to that 
found in transitional democratic societies. Whereas the disparity between 
southern and modern, democratic attitudes has been documented, the low 
political efficacy and high level of fatalism among southerners remain 
unexplained. Questions of why some American states develop politically, 
socially, and economically and why some states have a "civic culture" while 
others do not suggest a gamut of researches needed to illuminate the 
processes of democratic political development in the American states.
It is felt that the unique features of the South, as described in this 
chapter, mark this area as an appropriate starting point.
Comparative Analysis and the Southern Mosaic
In efforts to understand dissimilarities within the South and to
define the nature of southern development in relation to other developing
areas, the eleven, onee-Confederate states are comparatively studied.
In order to discern the more factual and less speculative elements which
have variously shaped southern political development, it is necessary to
disparage at the onset lingering notions of a southern monolith.! In
observing that ". . .the South is not of one piece in its reaction to
the forces of change," Allan Sindler does just this.
Whether the focus be effectuation of law, economic development, the 
evolution of race relationships, or the shaping of new political pat-
■ C^f. V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).
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terns, emphasis can properly be placed on the variations of response 
within the South, and on some of the important factors associated 
with such variations.
Realization of the Southfs growing diversity, however, should 
not be interpreted to mean the passing of the South as a unique region.
Today, as much as ever, the reality of the South— tainted by nostalgia 
about the past, frustration about the present, and uncertainty about the 
future— persists.^
The intrinsic, sometimes imperceptible forces binding the South 
manifest themselves as an implacable sense of community— a pride of be­
longing among southerners. Although the precise basis of this cohesion 
and patriotic identification is not clear, it nonetheless persists.
Whereas new influences continually confront old habits and the old South 
is ostensibly shifting its foundations, an abiding sense of southernity 
is yet sustained.
This southernity is like a changing mosaic, in which distinctive 
colors and shapes change while the essential unity remains the same. Both 
tenacious continuity and pervasive change are basic ingredients making 
the South an appropriate focus for studying democratic political devel­
opment.
The Southern Political Milieu
Politics, throughout the South, has been perhaps the one aspect of
social life reflecting the most diversity and complexity.
There are, as Ralph McGill loves to say, many Souths with many politi­
cal faces. There is and is not likely to be any single and uniform
1-Allan Sindler, "Epilogue," Change in the Contemporary South 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1963), pp. 223-24.
2Frank Vandiver (ed.), The Idea of the South (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. vi-ix, passim.
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pattern and rate of political movements and organizations. The diversity 
and complexity of the region prevent such development.1
The enigma of southern politics— the seemingly inexplicable differences 
among the states in levels of participation, party and faction competi­
tion, and the scope and direction of public policies— continues and in 
many respects grows more rather than less perplexing.
The need to understand and act upon some of the characteristics 
of southern political institutions is implied by Samuel Cook’s obser­
vations regarding the strains between political development and moderni­
zation in the region.
Instead of serious and imaginative attempts to translate the inevit­
able consequences of vast technological, economic, legal, educational, 
industrial and human innovation into realities of political life,
Southern politicians sought desperately to isolate and freeze the 
political process and to erect permanent bulwarks against the invading 
tides of change. The consequence of the absence of a genuine confront­
ation of politics and revolutionary historic change has all the 
brooding reality of Greek tragedy.
Cook’s tacit thesis that southern political institutions and practices
have functioned to restrain, rather than nurture, modernization represents
a significant departure from the general thesis that democratic structures
and social change are mutually re-inforcing.
Viewing political development and modernization as naturally con­
comitant processes through which the political, economic, and social sys­
tems inter-act to tame the tides of change, Alexander Heard describes the 
role of the political system:
Economic and social systems possess great power. . .used to form and 
influence the political system of the community. The political system 
possesses power of its own through the control over the formal rules 
that govern the community, and it can thereby alter economic and social
^Samuel Cook, "Political Movements and Organizations," in Avery 




conditions. A dynamic interplay is created in which government is 
both the product of the economic and social conditions and an agency 
• . .through which the community can preserve or change these con­
ditions.!
The dynamic interplay typical of southern political systems, however, 
appears somewhat anomalous.
Political systems in the South are typically "products" rather
than "agents" of social and economic factors. Political offices often
carry little generating power of their own; and authoritative decisions
come largely from power concentrations immune to the democratic "rules
of the game." Formal political institutions frequently neither share,
curb, nor mitigate power and influence entrenched outside government.
In the South, the social and economic matrix that has perpetuated 
one—party politics is dominated by what Jasper Shannon calls the 
'banker-merchant-farraer-lawyer-doctor-governing class.f This class 
has had its way in much of the South most of the time since Recon­
struction, and the (nominally) political institution through which it 
. has ruled is the one-party system. Once this system became established 
via political channels, it generated its own self-perpetuating forces. 
[This] governing class governed not at the expence of the Negro alone, 
but also at the expence of the other whites, the tenant farmers, mill 
hands, and persons of humble status g e n e r a l l y .2
Inasmuch as formal democratic groundrules for decision-making are conve­
niently superceded by the demands of private interests, authoritative 
power in the South has a personal rather than political base. Financial 
statements and social registers are looked to more frequently than ballot 
boxes as legitimate sources of authority.
Southern Political Man; The Personal Style
Although formal democracy has been in short supply in the South, the 
tone and practice of southern politics has been democratic almost to 
the extreme— among the whites. Probably nowhere else in the country
^Alexander Heard, A Two-Party South? (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University
of North Carolina Press, 1952), p. 145.
^Ibid., p. 145.
have there been closer personal relationships between voters and 
representatives, at all levels of government.
The "extreme democracy," alluded to above by Leslie Dunbar, however, has 
been a.”.' . .democracy short on formal controls and efficient methods of 
obtaining popular consensus, putting a high value on informal means of 
effecting accountability."! These remarks present the South as the type 
of transitional society characterized by highly personal power relation­
ships .
The visible results of personal politics in the South " . . .  have
been labeled ’bourbon,* ’readjuster,’ ’redeemer,1 ’oligarchy,* ’aristocracy,
and ’special interests,’"
Whatever the label, there has been an awareness that political con­
trols in most southern states rested in the hands of a relatively 
few willful men as leaders, together with a remarkable small minority 
of participating voters.2
The personal political style, whereby political leaders define the public
interests in terms of the private interests of a socio-economic elite,
r
has been used to resist social and political change in the South.
William Nicholls describes the conditions under which an effective system
of economic and political oppression grew.
The South’s political structure was based on a narrow electorate 
which gave disproportionate weight to the economic interests of large 
planters. . . .  The South’s rural leadership. . .promoted its self- 
interest in a cheap labor supply by diverting the attention of low- 
income whites, through numerous devices which at least clearly sup­
ported their claims of superiority over the Negro race. . . .  It 
rationalized a policy of inaction toward the improvement of schools 
and other public services, toward social and political reform, and
Leslie Dunbar, "The Changing Mind of the South," in Leiserson, 
The American South in the 1960’s, p. 16.
^Thomas Clark, "The South in Cultural Change," in Sindler, Change 
in the Contemporary South, p. 4
^William Nicholls, "The South as a Developing Area," in Leiserson,
p. 25.
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toward the promotion of industrial-urban development. In such a static 
and stagnate environment, only by migration to other regions could most 
low-income people better their lot.!
Finding themselves outside the ranks of social and economic ac­
ceptability, southern Negroes and many whites were without political 
recourse. Elitism had restricted access to political power as well as 
its rewards, social status and economic gain. The criteria for access 
to power became ascriptive and highly selective.
Southern Apolitical Man: Victim of Oppression
One familiar with Bernard Malamud’s Pulitzer prize winning The Fixer 
cannot help but draw some poignant parallels between oppression in tsarist 
Russia and many parts of the contemporary South. The anti-semetic pogroms 
of the tsarist regime reflected, in a significant way, the social and 
economic power of the upper classes. The preservation of the status quo 
necessitated that growing dissatisfactions and frustrations among the 
lower classes be thwarted. Lower class bitterness toward their own way 
of life— the deplorable working and living conditions prescribed by an 
oligarchial, self-interested elite-— was skillfully, if only temporarily, 
rechannelled by "public" leaders into an obsessive hatred of the Jews.
The race issue— the intense hatred of Negroes among lower members 
in the southern hierarchy— was used in much the same manner by southern 
political leaders to insulate and augment their personal powers— political, 
social and economic. Racism in the South, like anti-semitism in Russia, has 
been a potent decoy— an elusive sanctuary'— shrewdly positioned by the better- 
fed, better-housed, better-paid, and better-educated segment of society to 
sustain their own stations.
^William Nicholls, "The South as a Developing Area, in Leiserson,
The American South in the I9601s, p. 25.
Whether one can accept or find meaning in this analogy is not, 
however, prerequisite to understanding a more basic point about racism 
and politics in the South. As the study by Matthews and Prothro aptly 
documents, the Negro and all that surrounds him and his ethnology is a 
crucial variable of southern political life.-®- In looking to why this is 
so, however, the black color of his skin— the sole criteria differenti­
ating him from so many low-income whites— is, realistically, a most 
arbitrary and dubious variable for political scientists to dwell upon.
Why is skin color, rather than hair color or physique or shoe size (!), 
such a crucial factor in the South?
The plights of ethnic groups or minorities in Russia, Germany, 
Ireland, to mention a few prominent examples, and that of the southern 
Negro appear similar. Yet, the phenomena of discrimination or oppression 
or exploitation— as an integral part of a community’s political culture—  
appear more generic than the stress on color or creed permits. Not 
blackness and its correlates, but the values and orientations imputed 
to blackness and the conditions which nurture and sustain discriminating 
attitudes are fundamental variables of political culture and, hence, 
democratic political development.
Southern Political Culture
Inasmuch as this study focuses on democratic political develop­
ment, the factors affecting civic culture— the political culture of 
democracy— need investigation. A civic culture, as conceived by Almond 
and Verba, is characterized by high political efficacy and cognitive, 
openly partisan, and participant orientations toward government. The
■^ •Matthews and Prothro, New Southern Politics.
^Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, pp. 9-16.
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southern environment is apparently not the most suitable breeding ground 
for this type of political culture. While this research does not include 
the attitudinal data needed for direct study of political culture, the 
analysis of aggregate environmental data does permit an indirect look 
at political culture in the South.
The beliefs, attitudes, and values which constitute the political
culture of a society are an integral dimension of political development.
The phrase *political culture* summarizes a complex and varied portion 
of social reality. Among other things, a nation’s political culture 
includes political traditions and folk heroes, the spirit of public 
institutions, political passions of the citizenry, goals articulated 
by the political ideology, and both the formal and informal rules of 
the political game. It also includes other real, but elusive, factors, 
such as political stereotypes, political style, political moods, the 
tone of political exchanges, and finally, some sense of what is ap­
propriately political and what is not.l
Verba defines political culture more succinctly as the "system of beliefs
2
about patterns of political interactions and political institutions.11 
Which ever concept" one prefers, it should be clear that environmental as 
well as governmental factors mold political culture and affect the impact 
of political culture on democratic political development and modernization.
In the South where "much that never existed is rememberedas the
backbone of its culture," tradition is a key determinant of political
culture. Daniel Elazar describes the conditions which nurtured a
traditionalistic political culture in this region.
. . .those who settled the South sought opportunity in a plantation- 
centered agricultural system based on slavery and essentially anti- 
commercial in orientation. This system, as an extension of the landed 
gentry agrarianism of the Old World, provided a natural environment 
for the development of an American-style traditionalistic culture
^-Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), p. 26.
^Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian Pye and 
Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 516.
in which the new landed gentry progressively assumed ever greater 
roles in the political process at the expense of the small landholders 
while a major segment of the population, the slaves, were totally
excluded from any political roles whatsoever. Elitism in this culture
reached its apogee in Virginia and South Carolina; in North Carolina 
and Georgia a measure of equalitarianism was introduced by the arrival 
of significant numbers of migrants. . . .2-
A matrix of factors link economic development and political culture
". . .in the sense that abundance and growth are more likely to support a
civic culture than poverty and immiseration."
As affluence increases, inter-personal trust increases, political 
partisanship takes on different meaning, class awareness relaxes and 
class voting diminishes in importance, the openess of the political 
system to participation by racial minorities is facillitated and 
political alienation declines.^
Other environmental factors, such as education, communication, and urban­
ization, can be investigated as agents of political socialization which 
make the link between political culture and political development more 
visible.
^Daniel Elazar, American Federalism (New York: Crowell. 1966).
102. ‘
2Samuel Patterson, "The Political Cultures of the American States," 
Journal of Politics, 30, (May, 1968), p. 206.
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TABLE 1.— Southern and Non-Southern Attitudes Toward Government
Question
Number
Per Cent Agreeing in 
Item South Non-South Difference
11a Regularly follow politics and 
government affairs 10.7 28.2 17.5
15 Don't understand national and 
international issues at all 39.3 13.1 26.2
23 Impossible to change local 
regulation which you consider 
uniust or harmful 58.9 23.1 35.8
24 Would not try to change such 
a regulation 62.5 24.5 38.0
30a Political party is most 
effective vehicle for chang­
ing governmental decision 8.9 24.0 15.1
35 Your point of view would be 
seriously considered at 
government office 23.2 49.4 26.2
72a Agree that voting is the main 
thing that decides how things 
are run in this country 87.5 70.5 17.0
72b Agree that people will take 
advantage of you 83.9 66.5 17.4
72e ... Agree that human nature is 
co-operative 53.6 81.6 28.0
72f Agree that people like me 
don't have any say 50.0 36.5 14.5
72h Agree that no one cares 
about you 58.9 36.7 22.2
82 Economic situation of my 
family will go up in next 
ten years 33.9 50.9 17.0
Source: Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines, eds., Politics in the American
States (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965), excerpts from 
Table 1, p. 13 as drawn from a study by Almond and Verba, The 
Civic Culture.
CHAPTER VI
SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:
AN EMPIRICAL MODEL
The Communications Model of Democratic Political Development, 
proposed by McCrone and Cnudde and discussed in the previous chapters, 
is based on empirical data from seventy-seven nations. If, as the 
authors state, the propositions derived from this model represent 
the "beginnings of a parsimonious theory of democratic political 
development,” one would expect the theory, or model, to be applicable 
to.jyaried units of analysis. If similar data from the southern states 
can be fitted to this model, one might reasonably expect the empirical 
theory of democratic political development, which Lipset, Lerner, 
Cutright, and McCrone and Cnudde together build, to illuminate the 
process of democratic political development in the South.
To test the logic outlined above and to inquire into the diver­
sity of development, comparable data from eleven southern states are 
fitted to the Communications Model for three distinct time periods: 
1942-46, 1948-52, and 1960-64. The attempt to provide a more longi­
tudinal look at development by considering different time periods did 
not have the anticipated effect of accentuating the successive stages 
of development prescribed by the theory. Moreover, because the fit 
of the data to the model varied over the time periods, several ques­
tions regarding the applicability of the model and the interpretation
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of findings derived in this manner need to be raised. Before turning 
to these questions, however, the methodology used to replicate the 
He Crone-Cnudde study in the American South is discussed.
' «
Operationalizing the Concepts 
Urbanization (U), Education (E), Communications (C), and Demo­
cratic Political Development (DPD) are the major variables investi­
gated in this part of the analysis. The unavailability of consistent 
indicators for all these concepts precluded the longitudinal perspec­
tive of the political development process which was desired. For only 
two variables, Urbanization and Democratic Political Development, were 
similar data found for all time segments.
The census definition of Urbanization--population living in 
concentrations of 2500 or more—  is used throughout; as is the opera­
tional definition of Democratic Political Development which is given 
below. The indicators for Education and Communications are outlined 
below according to time period.
Education:
1942-46 Median years schools completed (1940)
College students per 1000 population (1942)
1948-52 Median years school completed (1950)
College students per 1000 population (1950)
Per cent populationvaged 25 and older literate (1950) 
1960-64 Median years school completed (1960)
Per cent literate, i.e.Fifth grade education (1960)
Per cent with high school education or above (1960)
Per cent with college education or above (1960)
Communications:
1942-46 Telephones per 1000 population (1937)
1948-52 Daily newspaper circulation (1953) per 1000
population (1950)
1960-64 Per cent housing units with radio (1961)
Per cent housing units with telephone (1961)
Per cent housing units with television (1961)
From the discussion about conceptualizing political development 
in Chapter II, it is clear that the political variable can be conceived 
and operationalized in various ways. The desirability of researching 
selected dimensions of the political variable was pointed out there 
in connection with the adoption of a pluralist concept of democratic 
political development. In an effort to operationalize and study the 
development process, Democratic Political Development will be defined 
to include (but not necessarily limited to) political participation 
and inter-party competition.
Political participation will be measured for individual states, 
and voter turnout will be the basic measure. In order to operationalize 
State Political Participation (SPP), mean percentages of voter turnout 
in elections for Governor, U.S. Senator, and U.S. Representative are 
tabulated for each state over each time segment. Using standardizing 
procedures similar to the T-scoring method used by Cutright,^ an index 
of State Political Participation is constructed. The mean score for 
all southern states on this index is 500, with scores over 500 indica­
ting higher levels of participation and scores under, lower participation.
■^ See note 2, p. 43 above.
The second dimension, State Party Competition (SPC), is similarly 
operationalized. The mean percentage of votes for Democratic candi­
dates in the same elections as above is used as a measure of inter­
party competition. (The choice of this indicator is based on the 
assumption that high percentages indicate Democratic Party hegemony 
and, hence, low inter-party competition.) Standardizing the scores in 
the manner described above, an index of State Party Competition is 
constructed. Scores over 500 reflect greater party competition, that 
is lower Democratic Party strength, and those under 500 reflect lower 
party competition in state elections, that is higher mean percentages 
of votes for Democratic Party candidates.
State-by-state averages of these two scores, State Political 
Participation and State Party Competition, constitute the empirical 
referrents for Democratic Political Development (DPD) . Operation­
ally defined in terms of participation and competition, Democratic 
Political Development scores are assigned to each state for each 
separate time segment to form an index of Democratic Political Devel­
opment for the eleven states in each time period. The data for this 
study is presented in the tables which follow the discussion about 
model fitting for each time segment. Raw data is given in Part A 
and standardized scores are given in Part B of Tables 2, 3, and 4.
Similarities to Cutright’s Research
Except for Urbanization for all years and Communications for 
years prior to 1960, the operationalization of concepts in this study 
is quite similar to Phillips Outright1s. Though unlike Cutright's 
data in several important respects, the data for the last time segment 
offer the best empirical referrents for testing the propositions
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derived by McCrone and Cnudde.
In operationalizing Urbanization, population concentrations of 
2500--rather than 100,000— are used because of data availability. It 
is contended, though by no means proven, that both definition measure 
the same phenomenon: urbanization. It can be argued that had the 100,000
density criterion been used, the results would have been significantly 
different. It is believed, however, that while states' scores on urban­
ization may have been different, the correlations with other variables 
in the system would not have differed drastically enough to alter the 
interpretations of this research.
While the operationalization of Urbanization differed from Cutright's 
mostly as a matter of convenience, the choice of different indicators 
for Communications and Democratic Political Development was deliberate.
The concept Communications, as operationalized by Cutright, is heavily 
loaded with quasi-educational indicators, such as newspaper readers, 
newsprint consumption, and domestic mail volume. Daniel Lerner, in 
stressing the communications system in relation to the individual's 
capacity to empathize, would probably not corroborate Cutright's in­
distinct operationalization of Communications and Education. It 
would seem imperative that Communications be operationalized in terms 
of indicators functioning to enhance empathy and that indicators of 
literacy be consigned to the Education concept.
Although Cutrightfs conceptualization of political development 
in terms of the complexity and specificity of political institutions 
is acceptable, his method of measurement appears detached from his 
concept. Inasmuch as the pluralist concept of Democratic Political 
Development adopted earlier may appear equally detached from the
operational definition given above, it must be stressed that the 
Democratic Political Development index employed in this research does 
not portend to measure the concept en toto. Rather, and this is 
important, the operational definition is presented as a measure of 
selected, yet vital, dimensions of Democratic political Development: 
participation and competition.
Before presenting the southern data and testing the fit of the 
Communications Model, it seems appropriate to mention one of this 
research's major shortcomings. This is, of course, the small number 
of observations. A county-by-county or district-by-district survey 
of the eleven states would yield a more valid and reliable basis for 
interpreting these findings and generalizing from this study. Based 
on only eleven units, the findings of this research must be accepted 
in the same spirit as they are offered: cautiously and tentatively.
The First Time Segment: 1942-1946
The investigation of the process of democratic political devel­
opment in the years 1942 through 1946 is based on the raw data and 
standardized scores which are presented in Table 2. Interactions 
among the key variable--Urbanization, Education, Communications, and 
Democratic Political Development--are indicated by the matrix of 
variable correlation coefficients constructed in Table 2-C. The 
model to be tested here, together with the inter-correlations between 
the variables in the system, is depicted in Figure 4.
Following the procedures outlined by McCrone and Cnudde, we 
investigate alternative models of causality in order to define the 
one model which best fits the data. Three variables together with 
their zero-order correlation coefficients are considered simultaneously,
and the actual relationship dictated by the data is compared with
the predicted relationship based on the assumption of spurious or
indirect association.
Prediction equations based on the correlation coefficients between 
variables are computed for each alternative model. Models that 
make prediction equations that are inconsistent with the actual 
relationships between the variables of the system are rejected.
The difference between predicted and actual correlations reflect the
degree of fit between the data and the model being tested. The series
of prediction equations used for fitting alternative models to the
southern data for the first time period are summarized in Table 2-D.
Turning to the first three variables in the system— Urbanization 
Education (E), and Communications (C)--we test the fit between the 
actual correlations and models which alternately predict a spurious or 
indirect relationship between (E) and (C), (U) and (E), and (U) and (C) 
These alternative models are depicted in Figures 4.1a, 4.1b, and 4.1c, 
respectively, and the degree of fit is presented numerically in paren­
theses beneath each model. The model depicted in Figure 4.1b clearly 
reflects the best fit or least difference between actual and predicted 
scores. Acceptance of this model, indicating the causal linkage 
Urbanization-Communications-Education, means rejection of model 4.1c 
which fitted Cutright's data and was accepted by McCrone and Cnudde.
Introducing the political variable DPD, the causal relationship 
of this variable with Communications and Education (the last two vari­
ables of the sequence accepted above) is similarly investigated. The 
alternative models are given in Figures 4.2a, 4.2b, and the degree of 
fit is indicated below each model. Unlike McCrone and Cnudde who
^McCrone and Cnudde, Ibid., p. 74. Cf. Blalock, Causal Inferences 
in Non-Experimental Research, pp. 60-94.
accept model 4.2b at this point, we recognize that model 4.2a actually 
fits the southern data more closely. This model indicates stages of 
development in the following sequence: G-- E-- DPD.
Incorporating the two models accepted above, we must now test the 
fit of the data to the resulting model which postulates, the develop­
mental sequence Urbanization-Communications-Education-Democratic 
Political Development. Using prediction equations to test the paths 
connecting this sequence, as indicated by the solid lines in Figure 4.3, 
against the actual relationship between Urbanization and Democratic 
Political Development, indicated by the broken lines, we find the 
degree of fit to be .053. The closeness of this fit permits acceptance 
of the model depicted in Figure 4.4, while the slightly greater strength 
of the path relationship (U-C-E-DPD) over the direct relationship (U-DPD) 
suggests compounding influences within the system.
This model differs from the Communications Model in that the 
positions of Education and Communications in the developmental sequence 
are reversed. The implication is that Education, rather than Communi­
cations, is the crucial link to Democratic Political Development in the 
South.
The Second Time Segment: 1948-1952
With this revised model in mind, we now turn to testing the 
southern data for the second time period, 1948 through 1952. The 
raw and standardized scores, the matrix of correlations, and the 
prediction equations used for investigating this period are presented 
in Tables 3-A, 3-B, 3-C, and 3-D respectively. A diagrammatic repre­
sentation of the variable relationships to be investigated is given 
in Figure 5.
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Again considering the variables Urbanization, Education, and 
Communications first, we seek the best fit for the data among the 
alternative models represented in Figures 5.1a, 5.1b, and 5.1c. As 
was found for- the first period, the data for the second period best 
fit the second model which postulates the developmental sequence 
Urbanizat ion-Communica t ions-Educat ion.
Adding the political variable, the alternative models of possible 
relationships are depicted in Figure 5.2a and 5.2b. It is the first 
of these models, Figure 5.2a, causally linking Communications- Education- 
Democratic Political Development which best fits the southern data.
Turning to Figure 5.3, which represents the model relating all 
four variables, the direct and indirect paths linking Urbanization and 
Democratic Political Development are investigated. The solid lines 
represent the path relationship linking Urbanization and Democratic 
Political Development via Communications and Education, and the broken 
lines represent the direct relationship between the two. The degree 
of fit for this model (.238), as measured by the difference between 
the predicted (.342) and actual (.104) relationship between Urbanization 
and Democratic Politic al Development, is probably too large to attri­
bute to measurement errors.^ Before rejecting this model, however, a 
more refined technique used by McCrone and Cnudde is employed here to 
measure the independent effect of Urbanization on Democratic Political 
Development.
•^The standard for model acceptance used by McCrone and Cnudde 
is that the degree of fit, i.e. the difference between predicted and 
actual correlation values, should not exceed .100. Ideally, the 
degree of fit between a model and a data set would be equal to zero. 
Because both sampling and non-sampling errors which are inadvertently 
introduced by the researcher may distort the actual or real correlations 
between variables, however, allowances are made for slight deviations 
from a perfect degree of fit.
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Path coefficients, measuring the "amount of change in the depen­
dent variable produced by standardized changes in the independent 
variable,"*- are computed in Table 3-E for each of the paths in the 
causal model depicted by Figure 5.3. The path coefficient for path ci, 
which is .252, indicates the direct effect of urbanization on demo­
cratic political development. Both this analysis of path coefficients 
and that above yield predicted correlation values greater than the 
actual correlation coefficient for urbanization and democratic political 
development, which is .104. Because this may indicate that the rela­
tionship between the two variables is actually strengthened by the 
causal links with communications and education, this model is not 
rejected. Had the actual value been greater than the predicted value, 
and the difference also too large to attribute to error, this model 
would have been rejected as well.
In view of this situation and the very low correlation between 
urbanization and the political variable indicated by the data, it 
may be reasonably argued that Communications and Education tend to 
obscure a significantly stronger relationship between Urbanization 
and Democratic Political Development in the South. If this is the 
case, it lends support for accepting the developmental sequence 
described by Figure 5.4. This sequence--linking Urbanization, 
Communications, Education, and Democratic Political Development—  
is identical to the one supported by the data for the first time 
period. Although the fit of the data to this model is not completely 
satisfactory, it does indicate clearly that the stages of democratic
^McCrone and Cnudde, "Causal Model of Democratic Political 
Development," p. 75. The primary advantage of using standardized 
path coefficients is to reduce the distortion caused by correlating 
variables with different variances.
political development in the South does not correspond to those derived 
from similar cross-national data and prescribed by McCrone and Cnudde.
The Third Time Segment: 1960-1964
The possible paths linking the four variables of the system and
the correlation coefficients, as derived from the data presented in the
tables below, for the last period to be investigated here are given 
in Figure 6. For the three variables in the first half of the system, 
the alternative models are represented in Figures 6.1a, 6.1b, and 6.1c 
with the degree of fit indicated below each model. Unlike the previous 
fittings for the first half of the model, the model in Figure 6.1a—  
linking Communications and Educations via Urbanization, offers the best 
fit to the data for this period.
Before accepting this model, which indicates a spurious associ­
ation between Education and Communications, it should be pointed out 
that the Simon-Blalock technique used here only suggests the best 
paths.connecting variables. It never suggests the direction of a 
path relationship. By indicating that the path relationship C-U-E 
is stronger than the direct relationship C-E, the model in Figure 6.1a 
casts doubt on McCrone and Cnudde's assumption that "urbanization is 
conceived not to be dependent on any other variable in the system."
The alternative to this is that there are variables outside the system 
investigated here which affect the Communications-Education relationship. 
In view of the dubious variable relationships in the first part of 
the system, conclusions about the links connecting the first three 
variables will await investigation of the second half of the system.
The possible paths connecting Communications, Education, and 
Democratic Political Development are represented in Figures 6.2a, 6.2b
and 6.2c, with the degree of fit indicated below each model. The com­
parison of predicted and actual relationships indicates that the model 
in Figure 6.2a offers a slightly better fit than the others. None of 
these models,.however, offers a very satisfactory fit to the data.
Because these findings are unsatisfactory and indeed suggest 
no model adequately fitting the southern data for the last time segment, 
the first half of the model is re-examined. The model which offered the 
best fit and was tentatively accepted for the first half is depicted 
in Figure 6.Id. This model is similar to the one in Figure 6.1a; the 
only difference being that the direction of the arrows has been changed. 
In re-directing the arrows in this manner, we now reject the assump­
tion that urbanization is not dependent on any other variable in the 
system. The fit of the data to this model affirms the sequence 
Communications-Urbanization-Education for the first half of the model.
The possible relationships for the second half of the model 
are depicted in Figures 6.3a, 6.3b, and 6.3c. The model in Figure 6.3c, 
depicting the causal links Urbanization-Education-Democratic Political 
Development, clearly fits the data best. Joining this model with 
that accepted for the first half, we construct the completed model 
for all four variables which is presented in Figure 6.4. An invest­
igation of the path and direct relationships between Communications 
and Democratic Political Development is needed to ascertain the 
validity of this model.
The prediction equations calculated to determine the degree of 
fit between the model in Figure 6.4 and the actual Communications- 
Democratic Political Development relationship indicate a poor fit (.131). 
As shown in Table 4-D, the predicted relationship is actually lower 
than the actual relationship between Communications and Democratic
83
Political Development. In order to permit a more accurate assess­
ment of the strength of the direct path linking Communications and 
Democratic Political Development versus that of the indirect path 
via Urbanization and Education, path coefficients are computed in 
Table 4-E to allow a more refined evalutation of this model. These 
calculations indicate that the indirect paths linking Communications 
and Democratic Political Development through Urbanization and Education 
cannot account for a sizable proportion of the association betwenn 
Communications and Democratic Political Development. In the devel­
opmental sequence from C to U to E to DPD, the direct effect of C 
on DPD, as indicated by the path coefficient of .145 for path d, is 
too large to be termed negligible or to be attributed to error.
Because the causal sequence C-U-E-DPD, depicted by solid lines in 
Figure 6.4, fails to account for the independent effect of Communications 
on Democratic Political Development, this model cannot be accepted.
Several alternative models postulating possible relationships 
among the four variables of the system proscribed by McCrone and 
Cnudde have been examined and rejected. Inasmuch as none of the 
models investigated satisfactorily fit the southern data for the 
•last time period, the implications of this and earlier researches 
need to be reconsidered.
The MeCrone-Cnudde study of seventy-seven nations over a twenty- 
one year time period confirmed the Communications Model of Democratic 
Political Development. They concluded that the "overwhelming important 
causal links in the process of democratic political development are 
contained in the developmental sequence from U to E to C to D."^
^McCrone and Cnudde, p. 78.
From the investigation here of southern data for two four-year 
time periods, Education, rather than Communications, appears to be 
the more crucial link to Democratic Political Development in the South. 
Although no completed model of the developmental process can be ac­
cepted for the last time segment, the partial models depicted in 
Figures 6.Id and 6.3c do closely fit the southern data and do point 
to Education as the more crucial link to Democratic Political Devel­
opment .
The difficulties of fitting a model to the southern data for the 
last time segment, above all else, suggest the presence of major vari­
ables— outside the sytem investigated here--impinging upon the devel­
opmental process in the South. Clearly, a satisfactory model of 
Southern Democratic Political Development will include variables in 
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TABLE 2-C.--Matrix of Correlation Coefficients, First Time Segment
u E C SPP SPC DPD
Ur ban iza ti on .59 .94 .21 .15 .20
Education - .72 .27 .41 .38
Communications - .22 .30 .28
State Political Participation - .67 —
State Political Competition -
Democratic Political Development -
TABLE 2-D.— Prediction Equations to Determine the Degree of Fit
Predictions Degree of Fit
Models Equations Actual Difference
4. la rUE rUC = rEC (.588) (.941) = .553 .722 .169
4.1b rUC rCE = rUE (.941) (.722) = .679 .588 .091
4. lc rUE rEC = rUC (.588) (.722) = .425 .941 .518
4. 2a rEC rED = rCD (.722) (.375) = .271 .284 .013
4.2b rEC rCD = rED (.722) (.284)= .205 .375 .170
' ‘ ■& '







Figure A. Alternative Models for First Time Segment, 19A2-A6, 
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TABLE 3-C.— Matrix of Correlation Coefficients, Second Time Segment
. ...............  ..... tf E C SPP SPC DPD
Urbanization .74 .88 .05 .12 .10
Education - .81 .52 — .48
Communications - -- — .45
State Political Participation - .61 - -
State Party Competition - —
Democratic Political Development -
TABLE 3-D.— Prediction Equations to Determine the Degree of Fit
Predictions Degree of Fit
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5.3 rUC rEC rED = rUD (.876)(.814)(.480) = .342 .104 .238












rUC = 0 
rEC - 0 
rED - 0











Figure 5. Alternative Models for Second Time Segment, 1948-52, 
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TABLE 4-C.— Matrix of Correlation Coefficients, Third Time Segment
’ u E C SPP SPC DPD
Urbanization .756 .845 .219 .312 .272
Education - .605 .401 .424 .427
Communicat ions - .295 .500 .404
State Political Participation - .851 .968
State Party Competition - .956
Democratic Political Development *•
TABLE 4-D.— Prediction Equations to Determine the Degree of Fit
Predictions Degree of Fit
Models Equations Actual Difference
6.la rUE rUC = rEC (.756) (.845) = .639 .605 .034
6.lb rUC rCE = rUE (.845) (.605) = .511 .756 .245
6.lc rUE rEC = rUC (.756) (.605) = .457 .845 .388
6.2a rEC rED = rCD (.605) (.427) = .257 .404 .147
6.2b rEC rCD = rED (.605) (.404) = .244 .427 .183
6.2c rED rCD = rEC (.427) (.404) = .173 i 605 .432
6.3a rUD rED =* rUE (.272) (.427) = .116 .756 .640
6.3b rEU rUD = rED (.756) (.272) = .206 .427 .221
6.3c rUE rED = rUD (.756) (.427) = .323 .272 .051
6.4 rCU rUE rED = rCD (.845) (.756)(.427) = .273 .404 .131
TABLE 4-E.--Computat ion of Path Coefficients using Simultaneous Equations
Path Equation Path
Coefficient
a (CU) bCU + rCU = 0 .845
b (UE) bUE + rUE = 0 .756
c (ED) bED + rED = 0 .427
d (CD) bCD + (bED x rCE) + rCD = 0 .146
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Figure 6





































SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The problems of fitting the southern data to an acceptable 
model of democratic political development which were reported in the 
preceeding chapter dramatize the need for further research. If the 
focus is the conditions of democratic governance, the effort to con­
struct a theory or model of southern democratic political development 
will entail the introduction of additional causal variables, and, 
perhaps, the substitution of alternative operationalizations for 
Democratic Political Development. If, on the other hand, the effort 
is to construct a model of southern democratic political development 
which includes both conditions and consequences of selected political 
system characteristics, new dependent variables, such as public policy 
indicators, must also be introduced and investigated.
In this chapter some additional data regarding both the condi­
tions and consequences of southern political development, as well as 
an alternative operationalization of the political system variable 
itself, are presented. This presentation is not aimed at postulating 
a precise model of Democratic Political Development for the South. 
Rather, it is intended merely to illustrate some possible directions 
for further investigations.
Because the most reliable data found for the South is also the
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most recent, this discussion focuses on the time period 1960-1964.
The new variables which are introduced here are Wealth, Racial Balance, 
State Legislative Composition, and State Welfare Effort. Both the 
raw data and the standardized scores on these variables for the several 
states are presented in Table 5. The correlation matrix in Table 6 
summarizes the inter-actions of all the variables investigated by this 
research.
Some Additional Causal Variables
Wealth, as measured by per capita income, and Racial Balance, 
as measured by the percentage of Negro population in each state, are 
introduced as possible conditions of Democratic Political Development.
The index for Wealth was standardized according to the procedures 
outlined in Chapter VI, so that the states with the highest per capita 
incomes have scores over 500. In similarly indexing the race variable, 
the basic measure was inversed on the presumption that states with a 
lower percentage of Negroes have greater racial balance and, perhaps, 
less racial tension; thus, states with a smaller proportion of Negroes 
were assigned scores over 500 on the Racial Balance index.
Both Wealth and Racial Balance are found to be more highly 
correlated with Democratic Political Development than the variables 
investigated in Chapter VI. (See Table 6.) The correlations between 
Wealth and the other environmental variables suggest considerable inter­
action, with the correlation coefficient ranging from .743 to .902.
In view of the high interacting effects demonstrated by this variable, 
Wealth does net appear to contribute significantly to illuminating further 
the process of Democratic Political Development in the South. Racial 
Balance, on the other hand, demonstrates strong association with each
political variable: State Party Competition (r = .715), State Political 
Participation (r = .666), and Democratic Political Development (r = .715).
From the investigations executed in Chapter VI, it is clear that 
no satisfactory model of Southern Democratic Political Development could 
be derived from MeCrone and Cnudde's system of variables. One reason 
for the generally poor fit between the southern data and the alternative 
models investigated there may derive from the simple fact of low cor­
relation coefficients between Democratic Political Development and 
Urbanization (r = .273), Education (r = .429), and Communications (r = .405) 
Using multiple regression analysis to determine the probability of
« C"
predicting DPD from U, E, and C, we find that Rp jjEC = *^67. Because
2less than a third (R^ = .32) of the political variable's variance
can be explained by the best combination of information on Urbanization, 
Education, and Communications, we may safely conclude that a satisfactory 
model of Democratic Political Development for the South must include 
other variables. In order to discern which combination of the five 
environmental variables investigated here can best explain Democratic 
Political Development in the South, multiple regression coefficients 
were computed. These findings are tabulated below.
independent Multiple Regression Per Cent of Variance









Race, Communications, and Urbanization offer the best combination of
three variables for predicting DPD. Nonetheless, even this markedly
good combination explains only a slight degree more of the variance 
(Kj)#RCu = *557) than does the Racial Balance indicator alone .512).
The crucial questions posed by these findings can be simply 
put: What are the mechanisms through which Race so discernably affects
Democratic Politic al Development in the South? And secondly, what are 
the other vital factors effecting Southern Democratic Political Devel­
opment? The multiple regression coefficient for DPD which takes into 
account the effects of all five environmental variables is only .75 
and, thus, can account for only about 56 per cent of the total vari­
ation in DPD.
An Alternative Measure of Political Development
The alternative operational definition of the political vari­
able which is given here represents an attempt to incorporate the 
political institutionalization dimension suggested by Huntington.
State Legislative Composition (SLC), as measured by the mean per­
centage of seats in the State Legislatures held by the major political 
party, is used to reflect the degree of political party institution­
alization among the southern states. The raw data for this indicator, 
which is displayed in Table 5, illustrates the very high degree of 
Democratic Party hegemony in the South. Because the percentage of 
seats held by Democratic candidates in state legislatures typically 
exceeds the percentage of votes gained for those seats, it would 
appear that the Democratic Party has successfully used the formal 
"rules of the game" to institutionalize a one-party system. Easton's 
distinction between the "government" and the political "regime" has 
apparently been undermined by a highly institutionalized Democratic
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Party machine in much of the South.1
Insofar as the southern situation exemplifies the dysfunctions 
of overly institutionalized democratic political structures, the scores 
on the State Legislative Composition index are inversed and then com­
bined with the State Political Participation and State Party Competition 
scores to form a second index of Democratic Political Development 
according to the following formula: DPD£ = .80 DPD^ + .20 SLC. As
shown in Table 6, none of the correlation coefficients between DPD£ 
and the several environmental variables is interestingly high. Con­
sequently, this alternative operationalization of the political vari­
able adds little insight into the developmental process in the South.
It can nonetheless be noted that even though the magnitude of associ­
ation is small, State Legislative Composition is the only measure 
investigated by this research which is found to be negatively related 
to State Welfare Effort.
State Welfare Policy
The two measures which are combined to form an index of State 
Welfare Effort (SWE) for the southern states are (1) state public 
welfare expenditures per capita, and, (2) per cent of the total welfare 
expenditure funded by state and local governments. Standardizing the 
raw data for this index, we assign scores over 500 to states which demon­
strate greater effort to treat welfare problems via monetary policy.
It can be observed from Table 5 that only three southern states (Florida, 
Louisiana, and Texas) score above the mean of 500 on this index; and 
that the per capita public welfare expenditure in Louisiana ($17.58) is
^David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," 
World Politics, 1957: 391-94.
almost three times that of the average for all southern states ($6.32).*
As indicated by the correlation matrix in Table 6, Urbanization 
demonstrates the strongest relationship with State Welfare Effort (.491), 
and Communications comes second (.381). The welfare policy indicator 
shows only weak relationships with the political variables SPP and SPC 
(.074 and .090, respectively) and a slightly inverse relationship with 
SLC (-.256). Thus, this preliminary analysis of zero-order correlation 
coefficients tends to discount the importance of the several variables 
investigated as determinants of southern State Welfare Effort.
Before rejecting this analysis as totally nugatory, however, it 
is necessary to point out the results of an attempt to predict State 
Welfare Effort from information on the other variables. The results 
of the stepwise multiple regression program employed for this are 
summarized in Table 7 according to the capacity of political system 
and environmental characteristics, both severally and together, to 
predict State Welfare Effort. The multiple regression program used 
for this analysis calls for the introduction of one variable at a time, 
simultaneously computes the partial correlations for each step, and thus 
makes "automatic” adjustments for the effects of variable inter-actions. 
For example, even though the zero-order correlation coefficient between 
SWE and C is second in magnitude to that between SWE and U, when U is 
partialled out as the first major variable, Education is "recognized" 
as the second major variable. One may infer from this that the inter­
action between U and C is considerable. This inference gains further 
acceptability when we recognize that the zero-order correlation coef­
ficient between U and C (.846) is greater than that between U and E (.756)
^Several studies of the Long dynasty and Louisiana politics mark 
the personality of Huey Long himself as the vital force behind welfare 
policies in this state.
for the southern data. Cutright's cross-national data (from which 
McCrone and Cnudde derived the propositions that (1) Education devel­
opment occurs in urabnizing societies, and (2) Democratic political 
development occurs when mass communications permeate society) indicate 
a quite different picture; namely, that the association between 
U and C (*71) is less than that between U and E (.75). The least 
that can be summized from this sketchy evidence is that Education, 
rather than Communications, appears to be a more crucial factor of 
both Democratic Political Development and State Welfare Effort in the 
South.
A second observation is the scant influence of the race variable 
on welfare policy (.026), as opposed to its striking affect on DPD (.715). 
The third, and perhaps most impressive, observation to be made from the 
findings of the multiple regression analysis concerns the high proportion 
of variation (about 81 per cent) in southern State Welfare Effort which 
can be explained in terms of Urbanization, Education, Wealth and Commu­
nications. Adding the democratic political variable SPC, the pre­
dictive potential is enhanced almost 10 per cent (R^ = .903); and 
adding SPP, the correlation between actual SWE scores and those pre­
dicted from a five-stage regression equation would be .965--an almost 
incredible indication of predictive power, which may stem in part from 
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TABLE 6.--Matrix of Correlation Coefficients for Selected Environmental, 
Political System, and Policy Variables: Third Time Segment, 1960-64
U E C . W R SPG SPP SLC Di D2 SWE
Urbanization .756 .846 .853 .596 .312 .219 -.027 .273 .223 .491
Education - .607 .902 .652 .425 .402 .031 .429 .369 .112
Communications .856 .754 .500 .295 .380 .405 .441 .381
Wealth .743 .481 .395 .163 .452 .423 .352
Race - .715 .666 .471 .715 .725 .026
State Party Competition - .851 .598 .956 .963 .090
State Political Participation - .379 .968 .915 .074
State Legislative Composition - .499 .683 -.256
Democratic Political Development (1) - .974 .084
Democratic Political Development (2) - .004
State Welfare Effort
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TABLE 7.— Probability (R^) of Predicting State Welfare Effort 
from Selected Variables as Indicated by Stepwise Multiple 
Regression Analysis
Step Variable Multiple ,
Number Entered R R^
Increase Number of Independent
in R" Variables Included
Environmental Alone
1 U .492 .242 .2415 1
2 E .632 .400 .1583 2
3 W .682 .465 .0656 3
4 • C .903 .815 .3495 4




SLC .256 .066 .0655 1
2 SPC .397 .157 .0919 2
3 D2 .418 .175 .0174 3
All Variables 
1 U .492 .242 .2415 1
2 E .632 .400 .1583 2
3 W .682 .465 .0656 3
4 C .903 .815 .3495 4
5 SPC .950 .903 .0877 5
6 SPP .965 .931 .0288 6
7 SLC .969 .939 .0077 7
8 R .969 .939 .0000 8
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
Prompted by an interest in comparative methodologies and attempts 
at theory building generated by scholars concerned with developing 
nations, this study has been addressed to one essential question: What
are the conditions and consequences of democratic governance? The 
underlying thesis of this research, which identifies the South as an 
authentic developing area, has been lent credence by the growing 
literature in Political Science which deals comparatively with the 
political systems of the American states. The current interest in 
comparative state politics is, in many respects, a stepchild of the 
more pronounced concern among political scientists with the develop­
ment of national political systems in transitional societies. Although 
the geographic areas of inquiry differ, both sub-fields'within the 
discipline have experimented with comparative methodologies in efforts 
to fulfill a common purpose: to build theories of political change 
and development sensitive to the socio-economic milieu.
One of the more perplexing problems in comparative politics, 
which may derive from the employment of too extensive geographic 
parameters, has been the multiplicity and complexity of social and 
cultural variables involved in the developmental process. A primary 
advantage of comparing American states, Thomas Dye points out, stems 
from their institutional and cultural homogeneity which makes it
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possible to isolate at least some of the major causal factors and 
thus simplify the complex task of theory building.*' This position 
is supported by Ira Sharkansky1s extensive study of economic and 
public policy variables in the American states. Sharkansky "iden­
tified instances where regional phenomena make a significant contri­
bution to the explanation of interstate differences in policy that 
is independent of economic characteristics of the region. . . ."; 
and pointed to the "likelihood that historical experiences shared
2
by neighboring states have had a lasting impact on public policies."
The incongruencies between the cross-national model of demo­
cratic political development proposed by McCrone and Cnudde and the 
southern data, which were reported in Ghapter VI, lend further support 
for adopting a regional focus in comparatively studying political 
systems. The transitional societies of the eleven southern states 
have been presented as a frequently ignored source of information 
needed to build empirical theories of social and political change.
This region is an appropriate analytic focus not only because of its 
historical, institutional, and cultural homogeneity but, also, because 
of the heterogeneity within the South. Clearly, there is ample evi­
dence to disparage lingering notions of a "solid South." Yet, there are 
few explanations of how the southern solidarity of I860 has become the 
southern diversity of 1960 and still fewer empirical theories which
^Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, pp. 11-15.
^Ira Sharkansky, "Regionalism, Economic Status, and the Public Policies 
of American States," The Social Science Quarterly, June 1968, pp.25-26..
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postulate the course of democratic political development and moderni­
zation in the South. If political development in these states can 
be illuminated, the potential for generating more comprehensive and 
didactic theories of change in transitional societies, whether in 
the United States or abroad, would be improved.
While this research does not offer empirical propositions 
concerning the process of democratic political development in the 
South, it does challenge those offered by McCrone and Cnudde. In so 
doing, these findings support the thesis that several theories of 
democratic political development may obtain from regional comparisons. 
McCrone and Cnudde work to build a theory which explains democratic 
political development in terms of three variables--Urbanization, 
Education, and Communications--which are causally linked in the devel­
opmental process. Although the southern data for the first two time 
segments did fit a model similar to that proposed by McCrone and
i
Cnudde, but emphasizing Education rather than Communications, no 
satisfactory model including the variables Urbanization, Education, 
and Communications fitted the southern data for the most recent time 
period.
The strong association between the racial variable and the 
several environmental and political variables investigated here suggests 
that an appropriate model of southern democratic political development 
must include additional causal variables. In addition to clarifying 
the mechanisms through which race so saliently affects democratic 
political development and to providing a sound theoretical foundation 
which explicity acknowledges the racial factor in the developmental 
process, further researches of southern democratic political develop­
ment need also to identify other causal factors if a satisfactory
model of political development is to be constructed for the South.
The immediate conclusion of this research is that the process 
of democratic political development in the South differs, and differs 
significantly, from that postulated by Lerner and reified by McCrone 
and Cnudde. The question now is whether the major variables and the 
sequence of variable relationships in the developmental process vary 
as a function of certain, definable factors peculiar to the southern 
case. For example, the South is presented here as an elitist political- 
community wherein a highly personalized political style grew out of 
a plantation society. In this hierarchialj private-oriented political 
community, educational advancement appears to be a vital step to demo­
cratic political development. In another political community, charac­
terized by high social mobility, an open opportunity structure for all 
citizens, and public-oriented policy makers, for example, mass media 
development may be the crucial requisite for functioning democracy.
Whether democratic political development or welfare policy has 
been the dependent variable, the findings of this research do not support 
many accepted notions about the determinants and consequences of demo­
cratic governance in the South. Rather, a challenge is raised to investi 
gate and identify additional factors of democratic political development 
and to conceptualize more precisely the causal links which inter-relate 
environmental, political system, and public policy characteristics in the 
region. For only with the identification and thoughtful inclusion of 
additional causal factors will models of democratic political development 
begin to match the complexity of the phenomena which they seek to explain
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